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EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL ASSESSED

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 11 Jul 80 p 7

[Article by Klaus Huwe: "France Expands Its Nuclear Weapons Arsenal"]

[Text] Paris, July--In the coming presidential election campaign there will undoubtedly be critical comments concerning Giscard d'Estaing's defense policies. The president, however, will have to fear a frontal attack on the principles of his military policies only from the communists. And even they accept today, though for different reasons than do the coalition parties, what was still a red flag for them a few years ago, namely the bombers and rockets of the strategic nuclear Strike Force.

In moving toward the next stage of France's nuclear buildup Giscard d'Estaing adroitly avoided the pitfalls which might have led to a collision with his critics. He proved the dictum which has been valid since the time of de Gaulle, namely that French military technology ought to remain close to that of the superpowers if France's nuclear Strike Force is to retain its credibility as the highest symbol of sovereignty. In this light Giscard d'Estaing's announcement that France has already tested the neutron bomb is undoubtedly a triumph in the East-West poker game.

The decision whether France will add the neutron bomb to its nuclear arsenal will only be made in 2 to 3 years. There is no doubt that Europe's military capability at that time will play an important role in the decision. The neutron bomb, however, will certainly be given the green light if the Kremlin cannot bring itself to reduce its rocket arsenal aimed at Western Europe. That is probably also what Giscard told the federal chancellor.

By then it will also have been determined whether the neutron bomb will be designated for use as a shell in nuclear artillery, that is to say for the Pluton regiments of the French Army (or rather its further development, the so-called Hades), for the fighter-bombers of the tactical air force, or for the new air-to-ground missile of the Mirage 200 which is now being developed. The headlines which have dealt with the neutron bomb have frequently overshadowed Giscard d'Estaing's other decision. In the matter of strategic nuclear weapons he has decided in favor of those experts who advocated

movable launching pads for medium-range rockets over those who supported a French cruise missile. During this decade, France will supplement its manned Mirage IV bomber with medium-range missiles which will be placed in bunkers in the Western Alps, and its strategic nuclear Strike Force which is based on rocket-equipped submarines will be supplemented with movable launching pads. These are supposedly superior even to the Soviet SS-20's.

By these means the French military want to avert the danger that the 18 missiles on the Albion Plateau [Central Plateau?] which are targeted at important sites in Russia would be neutralized by the accuracy of the Soviet rockets; that is to say that the land-bound components of France's nuclear armament would be eliminated. The experts will have to determine whether the mobility of the new missiles can be assured by means of a subterranean rail net in the same mountain region in which the launching pads of the current medium-range generation of rockets are located, or whether the delivery rockets should be mounted on trucks and secured against a hostile preventive strike in that manner. In any case, the French are determined to keep up with the technical development of Soviet and American weapons systems. It goes without saying that the constant modernization of nuclear weapons is becoming so expensive that a policy of covering all eventualities can only be maintained through a major effort.

Giscard d'Estaing has gained a broad consensus among the political parties with his military-political approach. To be sure, the Gaullists would have preferred it had the president already announced the next stage in the expansion of the submarine fleet. The sixth French nuclear submarine will be put into service in 1985, and it will be the first whose 16 nuclear rockets will be equipped with multiple warheads. The earlier submarines will then be refitted with the new rockets in a cycle of one every 18 months.

The Gaullists are of the opinion that, as the least vulnerable component in the modernization program of the strategic nuclear force, the submarines deserve unconditional priority. They would have preferred an immediate decision to go ahead with the construction of four additional ships by 1992, so that France would have assured herself a strategic submarine fleet of 15 units by 2010. Giscard is also aware of the fact that plans for an oceanic component of the nuclear Strike Force must be laid beyond the year 1985. For that reason he will probably announce the construction of three additional rocket submarines by the year 1990 this fall when a decision concerning the modernization of the navy will have to be taken.

Of course, as far as the Gaullists are concerned, it is not only considerations of utility and financial limits which dictate priorities. There is also the concern about the continuation of the doctrine of deterrent which was proclaimed by de Gaulle. Originally even the military experts of the RPR supported the recommendation in the Defense White Book of Giscard's supporters (UDF) already to introduce the neutron weapon at this time. In their own memorandum concerning military policies they have retreated from this position and have settled for merely approving the preparations for this weapons system.

This reserved attitude, which incidentally has also been adopted by the leadership of the socialist party in an almost identical decision, is to be understood on the basis of the distinction between strategic nuclear weapons as the instrument of deterrent, and of tactical nuclear weapons as the instrument of military confrontation. No one in France denies that the neutron bomb is a perfect means of defense against hostile concentration of armor, that the shock and heat wave restricts destruction to a relatively small area, and that the civilian population can protect itself against this weapon by means of simple earthen bunkers. The zeal with which Brezhnev opposes the development of the neutron weapon is an indication that he fears it as a factor which threatens traditional Soviet superiority.

France's skeptics, however, who are above all present among the ranks of the Gaullists, believe that the deterrent effect of the strategic nuclear force will be lessened by the expansion of the tactical nuclear weapons through the introduction of the neutron bomb. The possession of a large number of tactical nuclear weapons, they believe, indicates to the aggressor that there are doubts concerning the deterrent effect of the major nuclear weapons, and that there is a preparation for the kind of armed conflict which is supposed to be averted by the Force de Dissuasion, and which would result unavoidably in a devastating escalation.

For the left wing of the socialists which abstained when the party leadership expressed its support for the technical development of the neutron bomb, it is also important, as it is for the Communist Party of France, that French nuclear armament be seen as a means toward securing neutrality. Even among the Gaullists there are reservations about an automatic French involvement in a military conflict. The coordinated cooperation between France and her European allies in the case of war which the Giscardists demand is not included in the Gaullists' defense memorandum. But they too are aware of the fact that France's security is interwoven with her neighbors' security. However, they see France's contribution not so much in her participation in the forward defense, but rather in her preparedness to employ the strategic nuclear sword which provides Europe's defense with the dimension of a deterrent.

Giscard d'Estaing has decided on the strengthening of the strategic potential and is keeping open the option concerning the neutron weapon. Thus he avoids criticism by his domestic opponents and preserves the option of employing the strategic nuclear sword even in the event that America's interests may not yet have been threatened and may thus tend toward "non-involvement" out of fear of an intercontinental nuclear exchange. Giscard d'Estaing's concept for the integration of French and general Western European defense interests is, however, purposely ill defined: "France is directly touched by the security of her European neighbors." The threshold for the employment of the nuclear sword, however, remains unclear. It is certain that France's defensive concern will not only become active when Soviet tanks have reached the Rhine. But in the philosophy of nuclear weapons, uncertainty is an added security factor.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN EUROPE'S DEFENSE EXAMINED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jul 80 pp 97-108

[Article by Jean-Louis Burban: "European Defense Community"]

[Text] Jean-Louis Burban is an assistant lecturer at the Metz Law School and lecturer at Strasbourg's Institute for Advanced European Studies. His main thesis, in the following article, is that the European Community is inevitably bound to concern itself in defense matters. For many readers, this argument will serve to reinforce their opinion on the very existence of the European Parliament and its direct election by universal suffrage. In the final analysis--and this is the ticklish aspect of Burban's article--what is at issue is the very conception of how a united Europe can be built and how France can or must preserve its independence. Consequently the author's views are entirely his own and not necessarily those of DEFENSE NATIONALE. Nevertheless, his views do furnish food for thought on a vital subject.

The years 1978 and 1979 will remain two outstanding years in the history of European defense. The Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) went through an "identity crisis," and Maurice Druon's resignation⁽¹⁾ from a rapporteur's position was but one incident among others in that crisis. The European Parliament, the European Economic Community's democratic body, appeared to have taken over from the WEU by adopting a resolution, on 14 June 1978, which created quite a stir, at least in France. NATO also seemed to be undergoing a certain transformation. And, of course, the role France should play in NATO was a subject of continuous controversy in the political press. In short, things were stirring on the "European defense scene," and everything still indicates that this turmoil is not about to end.

The most noteworthy development, however, was the European Community's eruption into the problems of Europe's defense. This essentially economic organization took such action indirectly through its European Parliament. Admittedly, as we noted in a previous DEFENSE NATIONALE

article (February 1978), this eruption of the European Parliament as neither strange nor fortuitous. Since 1973 at least, in other words, since Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, the European Parliament has adopted several defense-related resolutions: the 15 December 1975 resolution "on the effects of a European foreign policy on defense problems,"⁽²⁾ and the 14 June 1978 resolution on "European cooperation in arms procurement."⁽³⁾

On each occasion, however, the European Parliament brought down upon itself the wrath of those persons and groups rabidly opposed to allowing the EEC to broaden its jurisdiction to encompass defense matters. With its 14 June 1978 resolution, the European Parliament was subjected to a veritable barrage of criticism: interpellations in the French Parliament about the resolution's validity, articles in the press, etc.

It is virtually certain, however, that in the future the European Community will no longer be able to refrain from taking up European defense questions. Not, in fact, contrary to what some believe, solely because the European Parliament is now popularly elected by universal suffrage, but more prosaically and more fundamentally because a certain number of objective necessities of our era and continent dictate that the EEC must cease ignoring defense problems.

1. Is the European Parliament's Decision To Concern Itself in Defense Matters Irreversible.

It was not by chance that the European Parliament's decision to concern itself in European defense matters, in the broad sense of the term, was concomitant with the identity crisis that still plagues the sole European organization legally competent to discuss defense matters, namely the WEU. One event obviously accounts for the other. Moreover, there is no need to speculate about which of the two organizations first "dropped the ball" or "picked up the ball!" There are some thoroughly objective reasons that militate in favor of transferring defense-related jurisdictions to the EEC.

First of all, two EEC countries--Ireland and Denmark--do not belong to the Western European Union. The probability of their ever joining the WEU does seem out of the question, otherwise they would have already done so. When the number of EEC countries is increased to 12, the three new member states--Greece, Portugal, and Spain--will raise this number of non-WEU member states to five. At the same time, there will then be two EEC member states--Spain and Ireland--that do not belong to NATO, plus two that merely "half" belong, namely France and Greece. These two are in the Atlantic Alliance but not in its military organization. Admittedly it is conceivable that the countries not belonging to these two international organizations might join them all together, i.e. join both the WEU and NATO.

Yet one cannot avoid noting that they have not yet done so.⁽⁴⁾ Under these circumstances, the odds are that the EEC may become the sole meeting ground in which all can discuss defense matters.

Even though the EEC is by nature an economic and trade organization, it is still, nonetheless true, that its objective is to develop a common market, a common economic space, and notably a common industrial space. Up to now, admittedly--and, in fact, paradoxically when compared with the initial designs of the architects of the Treaty of Rome--it is in the agricultural domain that Europe has succeeded in establishing a common policy, while the common industrial policy has continued to lag behind. But is the fact that some parts of the Treaty have remained a dead letter any reason to say that they must never be revived? Quite the contrary, and that was the thrust of the chief of state's statement in his 23 November 1978 press conference on Europe: "My second observation: Upon hearing about these requirements for extensions, one would think that we have fully accomplished the task and must now find another task to accomplish. Yet I reread the Treaty of Rome and I noticed that there are many things that were supposed to be done and have not been done, things to which the European Community's institutions ought to devote their activity. For example, the Treaty of Rome calls for a European transportation policy. Where is it? A few years ago, it was decided to initiate a European policy on one of the most important subjects of the economic and social life of our times, namely energy. Where is the European energy policy? At the present time, we are merely in the act--and, moreover, we will succeed--of creating a zone of monetary stability in Europe. But it took us more than 20 years to pull this off. /There are still a large number of subjects on which the European institutions need to work to fulfill the obligations of the Treaty of Rome."⁽⁵⁾ A common industrial policy can hardly exclude the arms industries, especially at a time when these industries in most member states, or in any case, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany, are experiencing an unprecedented boom which it would be hypocritical to underrate. It was from this angle of the common industrial policy that the European Parliament's "famous" resolution of 14 June 1978 was adopted, but not without some difficulty. The resolution proper was contained in one sentence: the European Parliament "requests the Commission to submit shortly to the Council [of Ministers] a European program of action for the development and production of conventional armament, as part of the common industrial program."⁽⁶⁾ Noteworthy is the absence of any mention of nuclear armament. Consequently any Community intervention in France's or the United Kingdom's nuclear policy is out of the question. It is likewise interesting to go over the whereases of the resolution. They are so brief and so clear in themselves. Following are two of these unequivocal whereases: "European industry must not fall technologically behind and must remain competitive," and "it is essential that a better balance be secured between U. S. arms sales to Europe and European arms sales to the United States." It would be very difficult to find a trace of Atlanticism in these statements! On the contrary, everything

initiates a sudden European awareness in defense matters and a veritable European outburst with regard to American power. In fact, how could it possibly have been otherwise when we consider the conditions under which the resolution was finally adopted. Incidentally it was approved by a scant majority, as is always the case on major issues.⁽⁷⁾ Careful reading of the European Parliament's debates on that 14th of June 1978 shows that not only the communists and Gaullists were united in considering the European Parliament incompetent to discuss defense matters, but the socialist group itself—the Parliament's largest bloc with one-third of the members⁽⁸⁾—moved "the previous question," in other words asked that the draft resolution be referred to committee. Finally, after failing to obtain this referral to committee, the socialists did obtain deletion of one whereas that could lend itself to misinterpretation and which read as follows: "the need to maintain a high level of employment in defense-related industries."⁽⁹⁾

Only a few months after the European Parliament's 14 June 1978 resolution, the WEU Assembly echoed the Parliament's action by adopting, not without impassioned debate, a Critchley report on "a European armament policy"⁽¹⁰⁾ which proposed coordinating the arms purchasing and production policy of European countries through an agency that would be either "a section of the European Commission" or an agency responsible to the Commission, according to a formula recommended by Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans in his 1975 report on the European Union.

The recommendation ultimately adopted by the WEU Assembly, by 19 votes to 8 with 20 abstentions, on 22 November 1978, following this report, even seemed to reiterate in some of its wheresoever the very same terms the European Parliament had used a few months earlier in its 14 June resolution. For instance, the WEU Assembly "underscores the necessity of joint arms production to permit interoperability and standardization of military equipment, ensure the survival of a viable European arms industry, and finally permit establishment of a two-way flow in the arms trade with the United States." Another example: the WEU Assembly "requests that the European arms industry be restructured under the aegis of the European Community by accepting its competence in the fields of industrial, customs, and research policy." No statement could not be any clearer! It is true, however, that at its 25th session in early December 1979, the WEU Assembly did seem to retract its position, inasmuch as a small majority emerged this time to delete from the text of a new recommendation on "arms requirements and procurement in Western Europe" the following proposal submitted by the rapporteur, Mr Meinz, a Liberal Party member from Luxembourg: "encourage restructuring of the European arms industry under the aegis of the European Community and its industrial policy." On the other hand, however, the same WEU Assembly proved incapable, for lack of a quorum, of adopting a position on the session's main subject of discussion, modernization of theater nuclear weapons in Europe, thereby strongly compromising its credibility, as the press later pointed out.

Better still, while up to then it had been mainly a question of European cooperation in matters related to conventional arms, suddenly the WEU began considering cooperation in the field of strategic arms. The November 1978 Baumel report affirmed that Europeans "must assume more active control of their own defense, particularly in the field of strategic weapons." (11) The conduct of the SALT negotiations gave the rapporteur some misgivings. He considered it necessary to draw inferences from the possession of "a nuclear force under national command" by two WEU member states. From the standpoint of Atlantic cooperation, Europe will have to make itself heard within the Council, particularly to obtain "a better definition of the conditions of its security in the strategic arms limitations context."

Under these circumstances, it is easily understandable that the European Parliament would--immediately after its direct election in June 1979--reopen the arms debate, and through this expedient, the debate on European defense. As early as September, the Christian Democratic and Conservative parliamentary groups requested, in the form of an oral question with debate, that discussion of the formulation . . . European arms program be placed on the agenda. In the community一体化, there are known to be no provisions comparable to those in the 1975 Constitution that would limit the European Parliament's freedom to choose its own agenda. Needless to say, however, when the European Parliament, on 24 September, was drawing up its agenda for the session, a lively debate ensued on the advisability of maintaining the oral question. Messrs Ansart of France's PC (Communist Party), La Malen of France's RPR (Rally for the Republic), and Jacquet of France's PS (Socialist Party), requested the question be withdrawn from the agenda by reason of the European Parliament's incompetence. After a roll-call vote, the Parliament approved keeping the item on the agenda by 208 votes to 87 with 4 abstentions. The substantive debate took place the following day. (12) Paradoxically enough, these members opposed to a European defense policy were the ones who talked about defense, whereas those members in favor of a European defense were very careful to speak only about arms! An apparent paradox, of course! In any event, the European Commission, to whom the question was addressed, confined its reply to Von Hassel and Fergusson strictly within the industrial policy framework. E. Davignon, the Commission member responsible for that reply, began by defining the limits of the European Community's competence: "The Commission serves especially as what has been called the Treaty's watchdog. Under these conditions, it would be incomprehensible for it to deviate in its position from what the Treaty orders it and permits it to do. And it is very clear in the Treaty, as it stands today, that defense and strategy matters come within the jurisdiction of sovereign member states and are not covered by the Treaty. And I do not believe that Mr Fergusson's question contains an invitation to act differently. Be that as it may, however, when we speak of industrial matters, when we speak of matters relating to government procurement orders and contracts--it being clearly established that the strategic and political options have been stated--is it not acceptable, legitimate, and understandable to ask ourselves a certain number of questions about the significance of these

government effects from the standpoint of expenditures and industrial growth? The Commission's answer to this question is affirmative: within certain limits and under certain conditions, it is normal for such reflection to take place."

Davignon then discussed what concrete action the Commission has taken on the matter. Basically very little, inasmuch as its action will be limited to studies initially (for an indefinite period): "What are we actually doing? The Commission has initiated various studies to determine exactly what impact government procurement orders are having on the development of a certain number of technologies that are useful and necessary to industry considered in the broadest sense of the term. I believe that this is an important question.

"Secondly, with reference to efficiency, the problem is one of determining how--once the programs have been approved within the framework of the sovereignty of the different states and according to their competence--we can make sure that the method of industrial development is the most efficient one for industry, ensuring employment and our competitiveness to the greatest possible extent.

"In conclusion, I wish to assure Mr. Fergusson that we will furnish the results of these two studies in whatever way the Parliament, and its committees wishing to consider this question, consider most advisable and appropriate. Then both by discussion with the competent parliamentary committee, as well as in the general context of our operations promoting technological activity and industrial development as directed by the Council of Ministers--and that is our business--we shall see how to assure ourselves that European industry has that level of efficiency and competitiveness enabling it to employ the largest possible number of persons and thus contribute to the stability and security of our economy."

2. Is a European Defense Policy Within the EEC Desirable?

This European defense policy was supposed to be formulated within European organizations specializing in defense matters and operating, of course, under NATO's overall authority. We are forced to admit, however, that this policy has not been formulated, either within the WEU or within the SAIG Eurogroup. Such is the fact established in the lengthy and brilliant study by Messrs. Vernant, Walter Schutze, and Andre Mattei published in a special issue of *POLITIQUE ETRANGERE*. (13) Although this study is not without some bitterness that shows through several times, its findings are, nevertheless, factual.

At the same time, a certain number of factors are prompting the EEC to fill this gap.

First of all, there is the EEC's capacity to become, within a relatively short time, a European confederation and no longer only an economic and social community. On this point, the authors of *POLITIQUE ETRANGERE*'s special issue acknowledge that the European Community is indeed the "hard core" of the construction of a united Europe and consequently its most credible prospect. It is this "hard core" especially because, unlike the Western European Union, for example, which is merely a discussion forum, the European Community has a budget--90 billion francs for 1979--and also because that community's Parliament has had substantial budgetary powers for several years now,⁽¹⁴⁾ powers that enable it to orient common policies or establish new ones. Whenever the WEC adopts a resolution, no matter how "maximalist" it may be, it does not result in any appropriation of funds, or even in any obligation imposed upon governments to comply with it. All the governments need do, as indeed they regularly do, is to respond to WEC Assembly recommendations by a demurral.

Moreover, is not the EEC the only European organization--along with the Council of Europe--which the countries of Europe deeply aspire to join? Lastly, internationalists tell us that a confederation's primary objective is a common defense for its member states.⁽¹⁵⁾

We must also stress the very basic fact that all European political parties, including the Gaullists and communists (Italian and Spanish), still view political unity as the natural extension of the three European communities established to date. So natural, in fact, that this political unity was nearly achieved on several occasions: in 1952-1953 as the complement of the European Defense Community (EDC) of most unhappy memory, and also in 1961-1962 in the form of the Fouchet Plan introduced at the height of the "Gaullist" reign. Today, despite the failure of a third comprehensive proposal--the Tindemans Plan--, this political unity continues to be outlined in the more modest form of political cooperation. Worthy of note is the fact that had the Fouchet Plan been approved in 1962, the European Political Commission it created--with headquarters in Paris--alongside the Brussels Commission would have remained separate from the latter and have been granted full competence in defense matters. The Fouchet Plan collapsed for well-known reasons.⁽¹⁶⁾ Nevertheless, it did recognize the European Community's competence in defense matters without reinforcing the machinery of supranationality. In the present international environment of 1980, how can something which appeared possible in 1962, i.e. granting the EEC competency in defense matters, now be considered incongruous?

The growing impression in political and military circles, and perhaps even more in European public opinion, is that the American "big brother" is no longer able to ensure Europe's defense as he formerly did. Symptomatic of this impression is the following comment by Jacques Issard in *LE MONDE*,⁽¹⁷⁾ a newspaper that can hardly be suspected of Atlanticism: "As pointed out by parliamentarians of the Western European Union at the most recent meeting of that organization's assembly, a certain number of experts in the United States and Europe consider that by ratifying advances benefiting the Soviet Union, the SALT II agreement is likely to weaken the credibility

of the American deterrent being employed in the defense of Europe. The fact that American strength is perceived as declining relative to the Soviet Union's mounting strength, handicaps the situation in Europe whose strategic cover by the Americans is now questionable.

"Europe's two nuclear powers, Great Britain and France, will have to draw the inferences from such a military development sooner than they had generally anticipated. Each one for himself or all together.

"On both sides of the English Channel, there are common interests that could justify a certain rapprochement. France is endeavoring to modernize its post-1960 nuclear arsenal. Great Britain is considering replacement of its Polaris submarine fleet. Two similar and possibly--who knows?--convergent goals, before 31 December 1979, date by which the United Kingdom must renew, or not renew, the nuclear agreements it has had with Washington since 1958."

The undeniable technological breakthrough in armament development by EEC member countries is also accompanied by undeniable waste due to the lack of coordination or standardization. A European defense would provide an opportunity to exploit this technical breakthrough and put an end to waste by having each country specialize in one type of armament (thereby also diminishing the "German peril!").

Conclusion

It was exactly a quarter of a century ago that the French Parliament, after a dramatic debate and a bitterly divisive vote, put an end to the attempt to create the European Defense Community (EDC). This divisiveness was so deep that the "EDC myth" still weighs upon people's minds in the current debate and influences many partisan attitudes. In the opinion of some, the EDC's defeat was a good thing because it enabled France to preserve its military independence. Others believe it was, on the contrary, a catastrophe, because by rejecting the EDC France threw Germany into the arms of the United States, the only power that could, at the time reliably ensure the defense of a vanquished and divided Germany. And for a long time.

It is unfortunate that this feud continues to poison our public life, because the fact is the EDC opponents and supporters did have one thing in common, namely that all of them were sincerely trying to find the best way of ensuring France's and Europe's defense. But there is not only one road to Rome!

After a long silence due to this terrible wound, the European defense case is now being reopened within the European communities. The altogether new international situation calls for such action; the credibility of the European communities authorizes it; the American withdrawal urges it; China clamors for it; and certain Soviet satellites quietly wish for it.

Nobody doubts that the June 1979 European elections have even further encouraged the European Parliament to concern itself in defense matters. Yet, could anybody seriously believe that the foremost politicians elected from all parties in the European elections would be eternally content to sit at Strasbourg and discuss standardization of mayonnaise, or the carnation leaf-roller moth, or the medical thermometer? Professor Lenguillons discussed this point with prophetic insight in his article "Scenario for Direct Election of the European Parliament":⁽¹⁸⁾

"The political parties are finding, almost all of them simultaneously, that it will actually be impossible to conduct an election campaign restricted solely to issues related to the Community's competence in its strictest sense, and this is true even for those parties most opposed to broadening Parliament's prerogatives and to supranational formulas. There are several reasons for this. First of all, there are the dynamics of the campaign itself and the resultant extravagant promises made to gain votes. Some parties will at the outset offer the voters a comprehensive European policy plan. No other party will then be able to stay purely on the defensive and delimit its action by saying: "We refuse to speak of defense, foreign policy, and culture. The campaign must be conducted solely on customs duties and the common agricultural policy." Such an approach would be electorally suicidal. All in all, it is clear to all political parties and groups involved in the election that they will have to expect discussion of all problems affecting human existence, and hence problems definitely outside the purview of the Community, and also anticipate that solutions will be proposed with a distribution having a minimum of coherence between the community level and the national level."

FOOTNOTES

1. It should be noted that Maurice Druon has since become a member of the European Parliament.
2. J. O. [JOURNAL OFFICIEL], No C 7, 12 January 1976.
3. J. O. No. C 163, 10 July 1978.
4. In the case of Spain, the lack of eagerness to join NATO is obviously no longer due to the pronounced hostility which the Scandinavian countries long displayed toward the Franco regime, but rather to a whole series of factors which range from the USSR's threat to link Spain's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to a revision of Yugoslavia's relations with the Warsaw Pact, and extend to the thorny issue of Gibraltar which is causing Great Britain to have serious reservations. (In this connection, see Guy Hermet's article "Is Spain Rediscovering its Old Demons?", DEFENSE NATIONALE, October 1979, pp 25 and onward).
5. Printed in italics by us for purpose of emphasis.
6. J. O. No C 163, 10 July 1978, p 23.

7. The Ferni report to the WEU had itself been approved by a vote of 23 to 21 with 1 abstention.

8. After the direct elections, the socialists have remained the Parliament's largest political group, but they are followed very closely by the Christian Democrats: 110 socialists, or 26 percent of Parliament instead of the previous one-third, versus 105 Christian Democrats.

9. A "whereas" proposed in the Christian Democratic report by M. Klepcz and deleted in plenary session with his consent (Document PE 83/78, 8 May 1978).

10. WEU Assembly Document 786.

11. WEU Assembly Document 787.

12. Meeting of 25 September 1979, J. O. No C 145, pp 106 and onward.

13. "Defense of Europe or European Defense," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No. 6, 1978.

14. As we have noticed over the past 2 years, 1978 and 1979. In 1978, the European Parliament used its budgetary powers to double the amount of money allocated to the European Regional Fund in spite of the Council's opposition to such action. In 1979, it used those powers to reject the entire budget by an overwhelming four-fifths majority.

15. See Reuter, "Confederation and Federation - Vetera et Nova [old and new]" in Melanges Rousseau, Pedone ed., 1974, pp 199 and onward.

16. For information on the "common defense policy" called for under the Fruchet Plan and on the reasons for the plan's ultimate failure, see Jean-Claude Mancler's excellent book, "L'Union Politique de L'Europe" in the "Que sais-je?" series, PUF, No 1527.

17. "Europe's Place in the SALT negotiations" LE MONDE, 4 January 1979, p 6.

18. POUVOIRS, No. PUR ed., pp 54-55

8041

CSO: 3100

THE CHAIRMAN COOLS INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 11 Jun 80 pp 26-29

[Interview with Andre Cools, president of the PS, by Hubert van Hunbeek and Johan Struyse: "The Straight Detours of Andre Cools"; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] Last spring, PS [Socialist Party] President Andre Cools did not receive the politician of 1979 award, because the political reporters could not quite figure out whether he had dominated the events of that year or been subjected to them. Even though Cools lost the election in 1979, he did manage, with the Martens I cabinet, to bring together the coalition he had wanted, with his government program and with the government leader he preferred. This seems to be much less the case this year. In December 1980, the voters of Karel van Miert and Andre Cools together sent only as many representatives to Brussels as the Flemish CVP [Social Christian Party] by itself. As to the question of the real strength of Andre Cools, the first point to score on his behalf for 1980 may well be the fact that up to now he has managed to fend off new elections. However, it seems as if his PS had to do quite a bit of wriggling for this. How much is the regionalization worth, which Cools -- after 10 years of set-backs -- should see settled this summer?

[Andre Cools] In addition to the problems which face all governments in Western Europe today, each Belgian administration has had to deal with the diverging evolution which has taken place -- for historical, economic and other reasons -- in our two communities, until we came close to the breaking point. The assignment which faces our party now is the following: could those of us, who want to change the world, first of all start with ourselves? Because regionalization will put an end to the fallacy that everything was the fault of the Flemish. Do not believe that I pursued regionalization as an entry ticket to the land of milk and honey; on the contrary. This is the end of illusions and easy solutions. French socialist Pierre Mauroy's definition of self-government also applies to regionalization:

responsibility, more responsibility, always more responsibility. From the very beginning, André Renau has tied the economic to the institutional, and this has remained the priority for us. We wanted federalism and state reform in symbiosis with the economic and social structural reforms. If anything comes of this now, then it will mean for us the beginning of an apprenticeship in a much more intense responsibility. It is not true that the region of Wallonia will receive less resources to manage than the national gendarmerie, but even if it is only a question of 45 billion francs, this would already be a sizeable assignment. We ourselves will now have to suffer fully the consequences of our own mismanagement, if it occurs.

[Question] Edouard Leburton has accused you of wanting to give institutions to the Walloons, while pensions can no longer be paid out. After he spent months agitating against the priority of regionalization and in favor of a three party coalition, you closed the deal. Where is the political logic of Cools?

[Cools] Ever since the congress of Verviers in 1967, we have been rather consistent in retaining the objective of regionalization which was /not/ [printed in italics] Leburton's priority, and which caused enough trouble within the movement. We may have deviated from just about everything, but never from this point. You can follow this right through the Eyskens I administration, the Fyskens II administration and further on. Because of this priority, we have rejected some participations as, for example, in the Tinnemans I administration. All the party's tactics and alliances have been reared to that goal! Looking back, we completed three large stages on this road. We first had to convince our Flemish comrades of this necessity. This occurred during the period of the pact between the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor] and the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party], in 1974. This required a great deal of effort on the part of the movement, because our Flemish partners -- among other reasons, because of fear of being in the minority -- were never in favor of regionalization. However, they then experienced a community development through Egmont and Stuyvenberg, whereby the views of Willy Claes evolved toward the evidently different accents of Karel van Miert. They then held their congress in Antwerp, which produced a dynamics which would make a split unavoidable. The Walloon socialists then found themselves at a turning point, and for the first time they were alone. We had to compensate for the historical solidarity with the Flemish comrades, make up for it with something new, and that became the French speaking alliance. We had no other choice; we had to go through that channel to compensate for our relative weakness. Was that a mistake, a betrayal? Last year, the Front of French Speakers did prevent our being stomped to pieces; it was our last stand.

At that point, power relationships within the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] began to shift. Outers joined the radicalism of Lagasse. Spaak, Persoons and Defosset could no longer change the fact that their party was making itself impossible. I do not deny that a trap was set for the FDF, but they fell in it with their eyes wide open. However, this did not alter any positions for us or for the PGTB [General Federation

of later of Belgium; we continued to insist on regionalization. There is nothing the CVP treated more in the beginning of this year than that the PFD should vote along for Article 3 from the side of the opposition. But the inhabitants of Brussels did not even have that much political judgement. Now, to the extent that my party and the union continued to strive for regionalization, what other choice did I have than a /tripartite/ [printed in italics] coalition and the price which would have to be paid for that? To me, there is no strategic inconsistency in this effort over the years, because state reform remained the goal for which the party had to find means and allies. At the level of the then existing circumstances, the French speaking liberals opted for a two-fold Belgium in order thus to set themselves up as the best candidate, next to the CVP, for a grab at power. We are already stuck with one Poujadist from the UDRT [Democratic Union for the Respect of Labor] in the House. It looks good in the general climate of moral indifference to be apolitical. The PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform] has had to guard its right flank against this by being strongly anti-union, by taking up a militarist position behind Close. Of course, all of this did not sound very encouraging for us in terms of stepping along with them. However, Jean Gol is a very /avoidable/ [printed in italics] kind of man. It may be that occasionally I get very rough with him in the clinches in terms of ideas, but for me that never extends to the personal or human level. I am not capable of loathing anyone; my mother did not raise me that way. Jean Gol and I found a few common points during the deliberations: democracy, privacy, ethical freedoms of the individual, and certain inspirations in education. This also applies to Herman Vanierpoorten. There are values in liberalism which must be maintained, which are definitely not superfluous in the irrational world we live in.

[Question] What was the meaning of your personal abstention during your party's voting on government participation?

[Cools] Because I was being generally accused of sending the party to its doom, I wanted to indicate symbolically, through my abstention, that in our party the president does not propose and dispose for everybody. I am willing, as president, to act as a loudspeaker for the party, but in difficult moments the members themselves must be willing to make their choice freely and responsibly. It was a difficult moment, because for years we had opposed a three party coalition formula. Hence, I did not reject anything with that abstention; I only wanted everybody to really make their own decision. That is the whole explanation, and they understood it. An additional reason was the fact that the round of negotiations had clearly taken a presidential turn. Therefore, democracy itself was the basis for my attitude. I returned from Lambermont with a package of stencils, threw them on the table and said: there it is; it is up to you now to judge. In inverse proportion, this may well be the weak point of, for example, the unions. I have always been a member of the FGTB, since the liberation. They have done everything in my name, but as a member they consulted very little with me. Aside from my role as party president, I was at most allowed to pay my membership fee.

New Political generation

[Question] The CVF did their utmost to be able to govern with the liberals. Now they got them without any examinations, without any election round. Karel van Miert and André Cools have tolerated this. Are you not afraid that, after having performed the feudal services of the program bill, you will be kicked out in the spring so that the Catholics will be able to continue their center-right packing of social security and the rest undisturbed? Is it not true that you will have to be reelected in December, at a congress which may be less interested in action and renewal than in opposition? And will you, in that case, still want to preside over the party?

[Cools] What I want is less important. That is given too much attention as though Robespierre had carried out the French Revolution all by himself. The best candidates are those people who do /not/ [printed in italics] put themselves forward. I have never been a candidate for minister, deputy prime minister or party president. Actually, it is surprising to me that I am still president.

[Question] It is true that you have made the PS take a fair number of virtuous shifts, but afterwards you always win at your congresses.

[Cools] We have altered the procedure. Henceforth, nobody needs to become a candidate for the presidency, because everybody is a candidate. This seemed to us to be the best way of protecting the right to a perspective. This means then that Cools does not have to be a candidate, but that if he is chosen from among the members of the /Council/ [printed in italics] by the congress, he will become president. Ernest Glinne has clearly announced his candidacy, and I find that very proper. I am not saying that the best one must win; all I am saying is that the party should make its choice. It is the party which must know what it wants. What Cools himself wants is /not/ [printed in italics] important.

[Question] Now that Karel van Miert has become the most Flamboyant of all the Flemish party presidents, you have managed all the more easily, at Lambermont, to find common ground on socio-economic issues. Is the movement going to return to unity within the opposition, or is it conceivable that one of the Belgian Socialist Parties might govern from within the government against the other in the opposition?

[Cools] Alas, these days you can no longer exclude anything. It would happen without enthusiasm, and it would cause an additional wound.

[Question] You can already see it coming with regard to the question of Brussels. The socialists have lost everything in the capital, which is temporarily a kind of territory of the state, but which is being tutored by your Philippe Mouraoux. Is he supposed to win back the 200,000 lost votes of Simonet and Cudell?

[Cools] For me, Mr. Cools is the comrade of unstated work. He has been the man of the self-employed, of the foreign workers and of the army. All those lost causes, however, he won for us. I can only have sympathy for such a socialist to the core. The fall of Brussels socialism is a drama which has dragged on for decades. Until the sixties, the Brussels socialists often played together with the Flemish comrades against those of us in Wallonia. From 1945 until 1965, the socialists from Brussels, with the help of the Flemish, always chose those Walloons who would suit their purpose. Thanks to the efficiency of the Brussels apparatus, they imposed their interest on everybody else. That apparatus had managed to eliminate internal democracy within the party; the polls were /made-up/ [printed in italics]. The 8,000 or so members from Molenbeek, together with the 5,000 from Anderlecht, decided who could become a member of parliament. Those who did not appeal to them, did not exist. My problem now is to raise a new political generation in Brussels, because the party and the Walloon socialists urgently need them.

[Question] In 1978, the Brussels federation of your party barely retained 4 of its 14 representatives from 1968, and yet each one of them became a member of the government or at least a parliamentary party leader. The less the federation still meant, the greater its appetite. With Moureaux, they have already had to turn to people who are not members of parliament, which at the very least does not fit in with the tradition of your labor party.

[Cools] Under the Byskens II administration, I wanted a competent inhabitant of Brussels among my staff. Simonet sent me Moureaux from the ULB [Free University of Brussels]. The young man looked at me suspiciously and warned me that he did not come to butter me up. That was precisely what I needed, and that is also what the Brussels comrades need now. According to the manual, from a sociological point of view Brussels is supposed to be the richest field for socialist growth. When you remember that the ULB is in Brussels, there must surely be a new socialist generation in it. What I expect from Moureaux is that he will manage to convince all the dormant socialists there that our party represents the most adequate means of expression for their social commitment.

No Solidarity

[Question] Didn't the Walloon labor movement pay too high a price for regionalization? How many concessions will Cools further be willing to swallow during the next few months?

[Cools] I have the impression that our country, more than any other industrial country, is stuck with the refusal of groups in its society who do not want to admit that nothing can be as it used to be any longer. Each administration here must begin with heavy mortgages, the first of which is the financial one. We are stuck with social groups which have dramatically been split up and incorporated. People have been set against each other, in their selfish desire for their own security. The wage earners are

opposed to the self-employed, as the self-employed are opposed to foreign workers, and you name it. All feeling of solidarity has disappeared among the millions of people who, after all, have to live here from the work of their hands. People have been allowed to retreat within themselves, up to the point where they practically no longer want to hear from each other. This has always turned out well for the people in power. If people no longer know each other, there will be no solidarity to threaten the establishment. What should have brought human freedom, instead turned into enslavement. When people only knew misery, they were united and magnanimous, but now they have even allowed themselves to be set up against each other with regard to runaway consumption. Within the context of wide moral non-freedom, the overall economic crisis has now raised the issue of redistribution. We have now gotten to the point where the question no longer is how much more consumption can be offered, but which consumption can be eliminated. This is the tricky context within which the government of Wilfried Martens will have to try to reawaken a sense of solidarity and responsibility. Because none of these things have happened without also wearing out responsibility.

[Question] In these circumstances, Belgian socialism has more or less willingly promised its cooperation to the right, which can now also try to solve the matter according to its recipes. What guarantees do you have that you are not being cheated in this bargain?

[Cools] Guarantees never get you very far in politics. The only real guarantee is provided by the people themselves: that there are still people with enough sense of responsibility to realize what is at stake, not only in our country but everywhere in Europe. This sense of responsibility must not only come from the government and from the unions, but also from the employers' circles. After all, it cannot be denied that the employers carry more than a little responsibility for the context in which problems have arisen, can it? The people who were once economic masters of the course of events in our country, also have a number of beautiful inconsistencies on their record. Everybody will now have to assume his responsibility for when things start to happen in the fall. However, the worst that could happen would be for everyone to dig himself in in his own position, and for the social partners, even before they let each other know their respective positions around the green table, to have already condemned the others' positions. This would not be a good dialogue. The fact that many people here lack the courage to admit that they have been mistaken for 10 or 20 years, is no reason to continue stubbornly on this road of errors.

2463
B20: 3105

SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW AMENDED

Main Terms

Nicosia I MAKHI in Greek 16 Jul 80 pp 1, 8

(Text) In its special session yesterday, the House of Representatives approved the new law on social insurance (proportional system), which will provide an improved and more complete social insurance coverage. The chief features of the new law are that both the contributions paid in and the grants paid out will be proportional to the salaries and incomes of the people insured.

Specifically:

For salaried employees and wage-earners, the contributions will be calculated on the basis of their wages or salaries, up to 84 Cyprus pounds per week or 364 pounds per month. The contribution will be borne by the employer, the employee, and the State in the ratio of 6 percent, 6 percent, and 3.5 percent of the income.

For self-employed persons, the contributions will be calculated on the basis of "presumptive" incomes (up to 84 pounds per week or 364 pounds per month), which will be determined according to the professional category in which the self-employed person is classified. The contribution percentage borne by the self-employed person will be 12 percent, and that borne by the State will be 3.5 percent.

With this new law:

It is provided that aside from the basic grant, the periodically paid grants will include also a supplementary allowance proportionate to the level of contributions which will be paid in.

Provisions are made for a relaxation of the prerequisites for contributions made to qualify for receiving marriage grants, maternity benefits, and disability, widowhood, and old-age pensions.

The awarding of unemployment compensation, sick pay, and disability pensions is being extended, under certain conditions, also to optionally insured persons who are employed in foreign countries by Cypriot employers.

The awarding of the funeral benefit is being extended to cover the death of dependents of the insured person as well.

The waiting period for awarding a sickness benefit to self-employed persons is being reduced.

The basic characteristics of the proposed plan are:

The plan will cover obligatorily and without exception all wage and salary earners and self-employed persons, and it will cover on a voluntary basis those who discontinue their obligatory insurance and those who are working abroad for Cypriot employers.

The new plan will be financed by contributions by the employers, the insured persons, and the State. These contributions will be linked directly to job incomes, and a person's total contribution to the new plan is fixed at a percentage of 15.5 percent of the pay which the plan will be insuring.

Comments on New Law

Nicosia I MAKHI in Greek 16 Jul 80 p 8

[Text] The Democratic Rally deputy, L. Ierodiakonou, in speaking yesterday in the House of Representatives about the new law on social insurance, stressed that this law will ensure a continuing income for all citizens, which will permit them to live a dignified life.

With the new law on social insurance, emphasized Ierodiakonou, people who are in a financially stronger position are giving more, in such a way that the financially poorer people are assisted.

Citizens contribute when they are able to be productive, so as to benefit when they are not able to work either by reason of age or on account of other circumstances.

Citizens who are able to work contribute in order to help those who cannot work.

With reference to the dispute which arose with the ETYK [Union of Cyprus Bank Employees], Mr Ierodiakonou maintained that under the new law, the bank employees will have additional benefits upon their inclusion in the universal social insurance plan. And all of those employees who have not studied this plan properly will soon realize the value of the new social insurance plan. And it is to the credit of the bank employees and of

their organization that they finally decided to call off the declaring of an indefinite strike.

However, in its turn the House of Representatives ought to sincerely promise that it will be willing to reexamine some of the arguments of the PTYK.

The deputies Karamikhalis, Ziartidis, Khatzidimitriou, and Papadopoulos also spoke on the same subject.

12114

CBO: 4908

INTERIOR MINISTER REVIEWS STATISTICS OF EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFUTTER ALLEGEMEINE in German 11 Jul 80 p 12

[Article by "baum": "Baum: Extremists Currently No Serious Threat to Democracy; Left and Right Splintered; Eastern Bloc Increases Economic Espionage; Report on the Protection of the Constitution"]

[text] Bonn, 10 July--Extremist groups in the FRG are continuing to lose backing, as far as the number of organizations, their membership, and election results are concerned. Federal Minister of the Interior Baum, presenting the report on the protection of the constitution last Thursday, stated that these groups represent no threat to the liberal and democratic structure of the FRG, even though some groups retain the will and the capability for violence. On the other hand, the report finds that there is an increased tendency toward extremism among aliens in the FRG, especially the Turks. To be sure, the overwhelming majority of the roughly 4 million aliens respect the law, said Baum. The report is divided into chapters entitled "Extreme Right Movements," "Extreme Left Movements," "Terrorism," "Counterintelligence," and "Extremist Activities of Aliens that Threaten Security." The report, Baum stated, drawing attention to the Federal Constitutional Court, is supposed to be "exclusively an informative contribution to the political discussion." No legal consequences should be drawn from it, especially as far as the employment of members of a reported organization in the public sector is concerned. Baum added that he continued to support the "individual case examination." The minister of the interior, expressing appreciation for members of the organs for the protection of the constitution, added that their work must succeed in bringing the constitutionally protected liberties of the citizen into harmony with security requirements. The number of extreme rightist organizations, including the neo-Nazi ones, has fallen from 76 in 1979 to 69; total membership has declined by 300 and stands now at 17,300. The largest organization included in this category remains the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). However, it continues along a path to dissolution. The party has lost, as it has already in 1978, some 500 members, with the membership numbering now about 8,000. For the first time its auxiliary, the "Young National Democrats" has lost members (about 100, with 1,400 remaining); the losses should be ascribed to the increasingly militant neo-Nazi groups, where a sharper confrontation with political opponents

should be expected. The report states that only one-quarter of the NPD's district organizations are "fully viable," that the party had no financial reserves, with recorded debts of more than DM 1 million, and that campaigns for financial support had had no practical results. On the other hand, activities of 21 neo-Nazi groups had increased considerably, with the organizations taking on a more and more conspiratorial character due to the successful police interventions. According to official statistics these organizations had 1,400 "activist" members (an increase of 400 compared to last year), of whom some 300 could be described as "hard core."

More than one-half of them is younger than 30. The largest group in this category, the "Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann," was outlawed in January 1980. The printing of extreme rightist publications has declined somewhat, having currently a weekly print run of 174,300 copies, of which not all are sold. The largest circulation is held by the DEUTSCHE NATIONAL-ZEITUNG with a run of about 100,000. The newspaper is called organizationally independent, but ideologically close to the NPD. The report further states that 389 extreme rightists were employed in the Bundeswehr and 48 in education.

The extreme left has maintained its activities, but there has also been a loss in membership during 1979. The membership of the various communist groups has declined by 3,000 to about 68,000. The DKP has, together with its auxiliaries, remained the largest party. By the end of 1979 it is said to have had 40,000 members (42,000 in 1978). The report estimates that some DM 50 million has flowed to the orthodox communists from the GDR. The circulation of UNSERE ZEIT, the organ of the Soviet-oriented party, is put at 35,000 a day. The DKP auxiliary, the SDAJ, has increased its membership to 35,000, of whom only about 15,000 are said to be active. The student organization, the MSB Spartakus, is said to have barely 6,000 members.

The report notes considerable losses in membership and declining activity among the groups of the "New Left," and sees the reasons for this development primarily in disappointment with "revolutionary examples" such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba. Only the "Communist League of West Germany" managed to increase its membership somewhat (currently 2,400), but the KPD dissolved this spring. The "Communist League" split in the fall of 1979, losing more than one-half of its 1,400 members; some of the former members presumably joined the "Greens." According to the report, the "Militant Left" includes factions that would not shirk from the use of violence.

Terrorist Threat

The importance of the left extremists within the higher education structure has remained generally unchanged. Within the student parliaments they command about 36 percent of the seats--the MSB Spartakus has about 10 percent, the "New Left" a total of 18 percent, and the formerly Social Democratic "Socialist Student Alliance (SSB) 9 percent. Within the

"Student-Student Committees" these groups command 41 percent of the seats. Minister Baum in his comments on these figures expressed the view that the left-wing cause could be found in the protesting attitude of the students. As the results of the extra-university elections seem to indicate, there is not necessarily a danger for the political system of the FRG. The report puts the number of left extremists in the public sector at about 2,500 (an increase of some 100 over the previous year). More than one-half of them belong to the Moscow-oriented DKP and SEW. Almost 1,000 of them are teachers, another 200 serve as academic personnel at the universities; federally employed members of the left extremist parties are generally discharging subordinate functions.

Baum expressed his satisfaction over the antiterrorist activities. The activities of terrorist groups continued to decline in 1979, numbering 11 opposed to 12 a year ago. These activities included several bank robberies, but no assassination attempts. The discovery of several residences used for conspiratorial purposes is said to show, however, "that the terrorist danger has not yet been overcome." Baum expressed concern over the "antifascist groups" that regarded the use of force as justified; he considers them a "reserve potential" for the "Red Army Faction."

The chapter on espionage points to the continuing predominance of the GDR, which is in addition to political information increasingly interested in economic questions, especially in microelectronics and chemical industry. According to the report 75 percent of the known recruitments and 84 percent of the discovered tasks emanate from the GDR. In addition, the GDR is attempting to recruit collaborators by telephone and in the course of foreign travel.

The membership of foreign extremist organizations exceeded 100,000 for the first time in 1979. The largest part was played by communist associations with some 63,000, and by organizations of the "New Left" (14,600). The remainder, 35,000, are said to belong to extreme rightist or nationalist groups. Bonn is especially concerned with the sharp increase of Turks in the extremist groups; their number has increased from barely 37,000 in 1978 to 14,000 in 1979. Some 29,000 of them belong to extremist nationalistic groups. In this connection the Federal Ministry of the Interior pointed out that there was no association of "Grey Wolves," but that several groups use a "Grey Wolf" as a symbol. Leftist Turkish groups are said to include some 29,000 members (an increase of 14,000 over the previous year). This figure includes the communist-influenced "Federation of Turkish Labor Association in the FRG" whose 80 member organizations include 18,000 sympathizers (9,000 a year ago).

9246
ISD: 3103

TEXT OF PAPANDRIEU OPEN LETTER TO PREMIER RALLIS

Athens EKONOMISI in Greek 12 Jul 80 p 12

Text Mr. Premier:

The situation which has been created in the press, especially after the decision of the Union of Daily Newspaper Owners ELKE to declare a lockout, must certainly be known to you. The consequences of this "cycle of silence" which has been imposed on this country are getting even more serious because during this period--both internationally and domestically--serious and rapid developments are taking place.

Unhappily, at this critical hour, the only source of information is the radio and television which are tightly and exclusively controlled by your government. You certainly know that several times in the past I have denounced the one-party character and the unacceptable way the mass media function. But if this one-sided way of information has caused problems in the past, today when the radio and tv become the only source of information because of the lockout--especially in the provinces--it is absolutely unacceptable and creates serious dangers for the normal functioning of our country's democratic institutions.

Mr. Premier:

We are witnessing a totalitarianism which has exceeded the practices of the most reactionary governments. The absence of any mention of serious political events--such as the PASOK proposal supported by other opposition parties for an urgent meeting of the Chamber of Deputies or the distortion of views as happened with my statement on the talks of the foreign minister in Ankara--show that the government of the New Democracy Party tries to gain public acceptance and shape public opinion to its benefit by covering up the problems.

This one-sided and deliberate limitation of public information, which is in flagrant opposition to the constitution and the basic principles of our democratic polity, cannot go on.

The Greek taxpayers and especially the farmers, while paying for the broadcasts of the New Democracy publicity campaign, are not informed about the basic issues which affect them and which play a decisive role in the future of the people themselves and of the entire nation. The great national and economic problems cannot be solved under a "shroud of silence" and the one-sided information broadcast by the mass media. I consider it my duty to denounce this undermining of the democratic institutions and the violation of the rights of the citizen to the Greek people as well as to the international political and press organizations.

Respectfully,

A. Papandreu
Leader of the Opposition
PASOK Chairman

7520
CSO:4906

PASOK CHAIRMAN HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Athens RIORMISI in Greek 12 Jul 80 p 12

Text The full text of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Chairman A. Papandreu press conference is as follows:

A. Papandreu: To acquaint you with our position we read to you the open letter to the premier. It is certain that PASOK has no intention of allowing this condition to continue. We have set as PASOK's first target during this period the enlightenment of the people and the attribution of responsibilities for the absence of information on the government and on any other factors, whichever they may be, which deprive the Greek people from being informed today.

We warn that we shall undertake this task, we shall shoulder the task of informing the people with all available means. This crusade will begin with the meeting of our Central Committee which will convene tomorrow or the day after.

It is unacceptable to leave our people uninformed at a time when not only the territorial integrity of our country but also the living standard of our people face immediate and significant dangers.

Only During the Dictatorship

We must say that never before, with the exception of the dictatorship (control of) radio and television, did we have in our country such a monopolistic exploitation of the mass media. I wish to add that even during the worst periods of the rightist governments, when the state had all the characteristics of a one-party police state, we did not have such an information blackout against the opposition and especially against the major opposition party and consequently against the democratic processes and our constitution. We are unable to follow Rallis and his government in the call for a "calm political climate" which is always presented to the people as an illustration (of the intentions) of the "new" government of the New Democracy (Party). We must respond in the same fashion they have imposed on the mass media.

The government cannot expect the major opposition party to exercise a calm opposition when, in effect, it uses radio and tv--the nuclear weapon of political conflict--in such a way, especially during a time when the Athens dailies are not being published.

We must say that continuing the so-called lockout following the joint proposal of all press workers has at least two inherent dangers: the first is that in this long period of news blackout which the newspaper owners wish to inaugurate, only the strong monopolistic newspaper publishing companies will survive. It is certain that a number of newspapers which express particular political views of the right or of the center will not be able to survive. The second is that it is inconceivable that the key issue for the lockout is the question of salaries and wages. The sums involved are too minor for such a heavy price to be paid by the political process in Greece and by the people who are deprived of information.

The government already gave to the newspapers interest-free loans to cover the salary increases for editors and reporters. Certainly, the money needed for paying the printers during the strike and the lockout can be found.

I really believe that if we have entered a permanent and final stage in the confrontation between the press technicians and computerized printing this question could be put properly on a sound basis under state supervision, even in the context of a bipartisan commission. We should begin the modern printing of newspapers without placing the burden of technological progress on the shoulders of a relatively small section of the press publishing workers.

A Presidential Decree, Too

In other words, I feel that even the dispute over computerized printing cannot explain at this moment the attitude of the newspaper publishers. It is sufficient to say that the government not only tolerates the lockout but supports it, wants it and the government would have already issued a Presidential Decree of a legislative character providing that no daily publication can be published in Greece as long as a lockout continues.

The government would have issued such a Presidential Decree if PASOK--even when I was still visiting Spain--had not made clear to the premier that in such a case we were not simply to disagree but we would make it "a big issue," to use his expression. We would carry on the fight against an unacceptable silencing of the press and the abolition of the most significant and basic rights of the Greek citizen.

I will end at this point by saying that PASOK will wage a determined fight in every direction. It cannot accept the silencing of the press. It cannot accept the abolition of basic, inalienable rights of the people.

in the framework of our democratic parliamentary system. I underline this especially for the foreign correspondents who, I hope, will report to the foreign press and especially the European press this unacceptable situation which exists in Greece in the area of public information.

Following this statement the newsmen asked these questions:

KAMVYSIS (AKROPOLIS): Mr. Chairman, by what means are you planning to put into effect the statement that you will deal with the "silence" of the press so that the people can be informed?

A. PAPANDREOU: We have no illusions because obviously a political party does not have the physical means possessed by the government. The actual form which our campaign among the people will take will be determined tomorrow or the day after by our Central Committee.

But I can say right now that there will be a great and continuing campaign by party officials--both parliament members and others--throughout the country. We will improve the Saturday EXORMISI both in size and quality. We will examine the possibility of publishing the EXORMISI more often, without excluding in the end its daily publication.

We Will Use Every Means

We will use fliers, leaflets, brochures, posters, all the means at our disposal--since we have no radio or tv--and we will make this the main issue at this time. Because we are convinced that if this problem is not solved today or tomorrow we may even go into elections under these unacceptable conditions. The government should not harbor the hope that by silencing the press it will turn the people away from the new position which is truly taken by the great majority of our people in Greece--the workers, the farmers, the artisans, the wage earners, the working Greeks throughout the country--to throw out the party of "New Democracy" from office and push forward the forces of Change. If the government believes that by such tricks which remind us of the fraud and pressures of 1961 and the "Pericles Plan" they have found a new method of stopping the progress of the popular movement, I am afraid they are going to be sadly disappointed this time. We have every intention of turning their own methods against them so that this government, the "mild and democratic" government of the New Democracy under Rallis, will fall as a government which has violated even elementary rights of the citizen in the context of the democratic polity.

Bipartisanship

KHYS & STOMIDIS (AVGL): Mr. Chairman, I would like you to let me make a comment and then ask a question. My comment refers to the second paragraph of your letter which reads: "Unhappily, at this critical hour, the only source of information is radio-tv..." My comment is this:

"In addition to radio-tv, the two dailies of the Left, AVGI and RIZOSPASTIS, are published regularly."

My question involves the fact that the parliamentary representative of KKE-Int., Leonidas Kyrkos, has made a specific proposal to the government--to form a bipartisan commission to place the mass media under its control during this period of news media "silencing." My question is whether you, as leader of the major opposition party, accept, approve and support this proposal.

A. PAPANDREOU: We are ready to discuss any mechanism--this is one of the alternatives--which will guarantee the impartiality of radio-tv. Of course, if I did not mention RIZOSPASTIS and AVGI I did so not because they do not inform the people. They do inform the people but like EXORMISI they are essentially partisan organs. It is only natural to expect that the information they provide will always have a partisan aspect, just as we would do in a partisan newspaper. This is not to be taken as an accusation because that's their role. But at this moment, the major opposition party cannot publicize even its own partisan views since EXORMISI appears only once a week, on Saturday. Obviously, we cannot and we shall not sit with our hands crossed. The AVRIANI is a new daily. I don't know how it will develop, what its orientation will be. We will judge it accordingly.

G. VOTSIIS (ELEVTHEROTYPIA): Mr. Chairman, is PASOK thinking or planning on raising the issue of state monopoly over the radio-tv networks, possibly following the model of the European socialist parties?

A. PAPANDREOU: This is a thought we do not rule out. During the 7-year dictatorship we had set up a radio transmitter in Italy, which of course did not function well enough to have a large audience in Greece. We have both the experience and the right to do so here. Should the government continue this policy I can assure you that we are not going to overlook the possibility of reaching the people through radio-tv. We will look into this, too.

Modern Technical Means

There are other more modern means which do not require a central broadcast station. There are new technologies which are very inexpensive and which any political party can obtain and use. There is no doubt that if this story goes on, we will move to get those devices because in whatever relates to the information of the Greek people we no longer see any difference between this government and the governments of Papadopoulos or Ioannidis.

PSYKHARIS (VIMA): Mr. Chairman, do you have in mind any specific actions to deal with the situation which has been created by the one-sided use of television?

A. PAPANDREOU: This is exactly what I said; we have [specific ideas] and we will define them more precisely tomorrow or the day after. For PASOK this is a number one issue. This campaign toward the people is a crusade to provide information but also a battle against the totalitarian use of the mass media.

AVRAMOPOULOS (ESTIA, MAKEDONIA, THESSALONIKI): Mr. Chairman, the PASOK Central Committee is scheduled to meet tomorrow. As you said, it will deal with the question of the campaign to be conducted by [party] officials in the provinces, and with the steps you will plan and decide. My question, Mr. Chairman, is whether you are going to lead this campaign personally, and also whether you can tell us in which area of the country you plan to begin.

"I Will Take Part in the Enlightenment of the People"

A. PAPANDREOU: This question will be decided tomorrow. Nevertheless, I can tell you now that my presence will be utilized but the time and place has not been determined yet, or rather the series of appearances and the exact date of my first appearance have not yet been determined. We will start with party officials and at a certain point which we will determine--of course, within this period, not a year from now--I will take active part in large mass meetings to raise the issue more forcefully and more decisively than heretofore.

ROUVINETIS (AVRIANI): Mr. Chairman, is there any information or conclusion that this lockout is centrally organized?

Results of the Lockout

A. PAPANDREOU: In politics intentions are not important. What matters is that the government is scandalously benefited while the people are uninformed, and you, the reporters, have no way to perform the duties of your vocation. You are professionals but you also perform a social function.

You have been deprived of this opportunity. The result, then, is the same as if there were collusion. I don't know and I am not interested in the police aspects of this matter, I am interested only in the political aspects. And from the political point of view there is no doubt that the results are the same as those of a prearranged collusion, if it existed, and of which I have no knowledge.

ROUVINETIS (AVRIANI): I would like to ask you this: Were you forced to take this position because of the developments in the Cyprus issue?

A. PAPANDREOU: I think that as I said in my letter to the premier, at this moment our national issues are particularly acute, heavy pressure is

exercised on the Greek government to make specific concessions to achieve the goals of the return to the NATO military wing and to sign a Greek-American agreement on the bases. The Cypriot question is also acute at this time.

Beyond that, we have the question of economic developments, of the government's economic policies, of the great impasse which is developing under the impact of New Democracy's false and class-oriented policies.

KARANIKAS (KATHIMERINI): Mr. Chairman, you said that the way the lockout is developing we are moving into a monopolization of the press as only the large newspaper companies will survive--that, in other words, the small newspapers will close down and consequently the basic rights of the press are being threatened, freedom of the press and constitutional rights. As the major opposition party, do you intend to propose other specific measures for the protection of the press beyond the enlightenment of the people you plan to undertake?

A. PAPANDREOU: I don't know if you remember--surely some of you must--that I once gave a speech at a dinner of the Union of Athens Daily Newspaper ESIEA. Of course, the views I expressed then may have been visionary--as to what we can expect from the press in a democratic state. Very likely many of those proposals are not practically feasible today, but the positions and the views of PASOK are there and I would suggest--even I don't remember all the details--that you consult them because they constitute a comprehensive proposal related to the overall question of freedom of the press.

Certainly I, too, agree absolutely--I, too, said it--that if this "cycle of silence" continues for long, it will lead to a radical change in the structure of the Athenian newspaper, no doubt about it.

RIGOS (UNITED PRESS): Mr. Chairman, the owners of the two largest newspaper companies which at this moment have called the lockout are your political friends. Why do you not use your influence to change their mistaken course which leaves the people without information? Second, why is there so much support for a small group of workers, small in number, with very high wages, who have more privileges than any other Greek worker, such as reduced taxation, free use of public transportation, free passes to cinemas, theaters, etc? Why such special concern for this group? If you accept that this was done because their profession was very unhealthy, the new technology which is not available eliminates all those unhealthy conditions.

A. PAPANDREOU: I will answer your second point first. PASOK is a socialist party in spite of the fact that there are great differences among the various strata of working people with regard to income, as they also exist in our farm economy where 15 to 20 percent of the farmers operate farming enterprises which are large by Greek standards while 30 percent are, as

you know, tied to a small piece of farm land which is not really enough to provide a livelihood. There are, therefore, several strata among the classes of workers. The printers are a privileged workers' group. But this is not our subject today. That is, we can discuss it, and of course we can discuss in what way we can introduce computerized printing as well as what rights should be given to those who retire as a result of the technological progress.

But this is not our subject today because all the labor unions have agreed. The only unsettled question is whether the press technicians will be paid during the strike and the lockout. This is the only question. It is really amazing that this issue and only this issue continues to block agreement and prevent the publication of the newspapers.

With regard to my friends and my relations with them--just as they cannot determine and influence the PASOK policies, in the same way PASOK, conversely, does not try to influence their course.

RIGOS (UNITED PRESS): On the second question you answered, I would like to say that while you show such great support for this group of workers I have seen that for these...

A. PAPANDREOU: I already answered this point. I see no special support. The question is whether they will be paid for the days they did not work. I think that in the history of newspaper strikes these wages were paid in the past, if I am not mistaken. This is my impression.

KAMVYSIS (AKROPOLIS): I would like to make an unsympathetic observation, Mr. Chairman. The way you previously answered the question on the lockout, you put de facto all employers on the same block, which in the last analysis means that all of them have joined with the government in a secret conspiracy to eliminate the press.

A. PAPANDREOU: I think this is your interpretation, not mine. I did not say anything about a conspiracy.

KAMVYSIS (AKROPOLIS): No. I said that.

A. PAPANDREOU: Precisely. Then, what is your question?

KAMVYSIS (AKROPOLIS): You said that at this moment the end result is that this situation benefits the government. I mean, are they all together?

A. PAPANDREOU: I make no distinctions. Those who are in the lockout, they are in the lockout. Some of them will lose, some will gain. That's their business, not mine.

Réintroduction de la Grèce dans l'OTAN et les bases

Further in his press conference, the PASOK chairman made reference to his statement on Greece's reintegration into the military wing of NATO and the signing of a new agreement for the American bases. The full text of his statement is published on p 5 of EXOMI31.

A. Papandreu, speaking on this subject, told the Greek and foreign correspondents: "I don't wish to tire you with details. A long statement has been distributed and it would be tiresome to read it. I am giving it to you to use in the press as you wish. But I will make a brief presentation of its key points. I would ask you to be accurate on those points.

"The first is a restatement of the PASOK position that Greece must not return to the military wing of NATO and that there must be no new agreement on the American bases. These are PASOK's permanent views. Nevertheless, we must make certain observations, certain specific comments on the course followed by the government in its effort to return to the military wing of NATO--it is clear that the government wishes this very strongly--and wishes to do this within 1980, just as it wishes and pushes forward the Greek-American agreement on the bases, but having the two issues tied together.

"From a constitutional point of view, we have two articles in the constitution, articles 27 and 28, which refer to these two eventualities: the induction into an organization such as NATO or the granting of military facilities to foreign countries.

"With regard to Greece's return to NATO'S military wing it is clear that article 28, paragraph 2, is applicable. It is precisely the article used by the government for Greece's induction into the Common Market. This is firmly established constitutionally and this text will provide you with the basic reasoning which derives from the constitution and its sound interpretation.

"The question of the bases is more complex and has particular interest from a constitutional point of view, which I would like to underline. Article 27, paragraph 2, if I am not mistaken, states: 'Without a law enacted by the majority of the total number of deputies--that is, 151--no foreign force can be admitted to the Greek soil, nor can it be stationed or pass through.' It is necessary to have a law in order to pass through, to stay, to have installations.

"Of course, a military base is one aspect, one phase of this subject. But the subject does not end here. We have article 28, paragraph 3, which imposes certain interesting limitations which are not evident in the preceding paragraph: 'Greece may accept freely, by a law enacted by the absolute majority of all the deputies--151--certain limitations to its national sovereignty, provided this is dictated by an important national

interest, does not adversely affect the rights of man and the foundations of the democratic system, and is agreed on the basis of the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity.' These are three very important conditions related to the limitation of national sovereignty."

A Constitutional Issue With Regard to the Bases

"When there is a base in Nea Makri or in Souda, a foreign base, and the command of the base at any point, on any part of the base, is not in the hands of the Greek state, there is a large or small limitation to our national sovereignty. Consequently, foreign bases, according to the Greek constitution, can exist only if they do not impose a limitation on national sovereignty. But let us say that this one condition is satisfied. You cannot satisfy the other condition.

"We have the condition of reciprocity, which is terribly difficult to meet in the base of the bases. Therefore, if the government wishes to conform with the letter of the constitution it must not allow, in accepting a foreign military base, the limitation of national sovereignty, of the rights of the Greek state to command the base without interference.

"Under the constitution enacted in 1975, the only bases acceptable in Greece--according to the constitution, not according to the views of PASOK because PASOK is against foreign bases--and I want to underline this point--will be based under the real, not formal, command of the Greek state. I don't know if the experts of New Democracy who drafted the constitution realized at that time the serious problems created by the installation of foreign bases. They raise a first-class constitutional issue.

"But there is another point I want to underline. The constitution says that they must not undermine the democratic system. This means that the foreign agencies existing here should not have in any way or fashion the opportunity to spy on Greek citizens, political parties, or organizations. You remember a recent disclosure published in an Athenian newspaper according to which the CIA has indeed singled out approximately 45 political organizations, peace organizations, youth organizations to be spied on and reports sent to Washington. Obviously this is a violation of the constitution.

"A thorough study of article 28, paragraph 3, would essentially show that according to the constitution it is impossible to have foreign bases in Greece. I say this because it has not been brought up until today. It is a very significant observation. We owe this to the constitutional specialists of PASOK, and it should be seen as a warning with regard to the base agreement.

"I believe you have seen in EXORMISI, in MAKEDONIA and in THESSALONIKI--but certainly not in the daily Athenian press--my views and charges

concerning the talks in Ankara. These views have not appeared in the Athenian press. I don't think this is the time to repeat them. You probably know those charges. Unfortunately, the television simply mentioned that I had made a statement and gave only the last paragraph, after first presenting the premier's complete response in broadcasts by both the Greek Radio and TV and the Armed Forces Information Service.

"I believe you are familiar with the six points and it is not necessary to read them to you. I think that I have fully explained the meaning of this paper that I distributed to you and which I think deserves to be published in full, if at all possible."

GIKONOMIDIS (RIZOSPASTIS): Mr. Chairman, you spoke of the problems created by the military bases, NATO, and you also mentioned briefly today's economic situation. KKE with a resolution of its most recent Central Committee meeting again asked for an immediate call to elections as a way out of the present situation, the way it has developed both in the area of domestic as well as foreign policy. What is your view on this?

A. PAPANDRIU: I truly appreciate this reminder, because I had forgotten a basic point of this question. It has two aspects. First, that the government--since the constitution has entrusted the authority for concluding such agreements to the Chamber of Deputies and not to the executive, to the government--has a clear obligation not only to bring to the chamber these matters, NATO and the bases, but at the same time it has an obligation to inform the National Assembly Chamber of Deputies continuously on the course of the negotiations. This follows from the fact that constitutionally the only one with such authority is the National Assembly and not the government. The same applies to the president of the Republic who, according to the text, only in a formal sense represents the country abroad. Whatever he does is under the responsibility of a minister, as is the case with other western constitutions.

Chamber of Deputies No Longer Representative

I wanted to conclude precisely this: PASOK has argued that this Chamber of Deputies is no longer representative of the electorate. This is the reason we did not vote yes or no during the voting for a new president of the Republic. We are committed to this view. Neither the agreement for a return to NATO nor the signing of an agreement for American or other foreign bases can be ratified by a Chamber of Deputies which no longer represents the views of the electorate. This, therefore, is a basic conclusion. PASOK again asks the government to resign, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and move as soon as possible to hold parliamentary elections.

I must add that this view, this reasoning, this demand we believe will be realized in any event, because we foresee elections for this fall.

PYRGIOS (VIMA): Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that you do not accept that the Rallis government has the right to decide on such important questions, because it no longer expresses the public will. Consequently, in your view, the Rallis government by staying on in office may endanger the country should it make decisions on important national questions or should a national crisis break out. This being the case, do you intend to remind the president of the Republic of his responsibilities, to the extent that he, as the guardian of the constitution, is responsible for keeping in office a government which no longer expresses the public will?

President of the Republic Not Responsible

A. PAPANDREOU: As you know, the president of the Republic is constitutionally not responsible. With regard to the question of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the call for new parliamentary elections the constitution has an imprecise provision that among the prerogatives of the president is the right to call a new election before the end of the 4-year term of the chamber if he determines that the chamber does not represent the political views of the electorate. But if the president of the Republic does not dissolve the chamber and call for an election he is not formally violating the constitution.

This early election is something we had publicly asked of the previous president of the Republic, and this is something which is still there for the new president. The fact that the president has changed surely does not mean that we, too, have changed our views on the subject. But we agree that the constitution does not formally obligate the president to take action.

Consequently, no constitutional issue is raised. In our view, of course, there is a violation of popular sovereignty. But the way the constitution is written, such a violation cannot be formally established.

AVRAMOPOULOS (ESTIA, MAKEDONIA, THESSALONIKI): You said it before I had a chance to ask about the time you foresee the next election. Once before--I remember our previous meeting--you had stated that you foresee elections for the fall. But I would like to extend my question to the subject I had broached the last time we met, namely, do you see elections in the fall with the same electoral system or under a different system?

A. PAPANDREOU: I see the elections held under the same electoral system.

MODIANO (TIMES LONDON): Have you thought out how PASOK, if it comes to power, will abolish the treaty with NATO and expel the American bases?

A. PAPANDREOU: First, at this moment Greece is outside NATO's military wing. One might say that this is not entirely so because certain forms of military cooperation have survived, although these forms of cooperation contradict Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing. Formally,

however, there is no question that Greece has withdrawn from the military wing of NATO. Maybe, FAKE will come to office before Greece goes back into the NATO military wing, in which case the job will have been accomplished by Karamanlis in 1974. We will inherit an existing situation which is in agreement with our ideological and political position.

I must underline that these bases operate illegally in Greece today because the agreement on the bases has expired. They continue at the sufferance of the Greek government. Under these conditions, there is not a question of expelling the bases. The bases function illegally today in Greece. Very simply, a FAKE government will not violate the law, as the Rallis government does today, as the Karamanlis government did before that.

Should PASOK find Greece within NATO, should PASOK find those agreements on the bases signed, we are, as I have stressed, a parliamentary party, we are not a revolutionary party, we will follow a course in keeping with our ideological and political positions which we present to the Greek people as a matter of commitment. But the procedure will be beyond reproach as far as the formalities are concerned. In other words, we are not going to move ahead by trampling on the authority of the Chamber of Deputies or the jurisdiction of the government under the constitution.

We are not going to state precisely now, Mr. Modiano, our tactics and our course in the event we find Greece in NATO (military wing) or find the agreement on the bases already signed. Our objective is to get the bases out and we will set the appropriate machinery in motion for this, as we will do for our withdrawal from NATO. But this is not something that can be done in 24 hours. Even France took a whole year to effect its withdrawal from the military wing of NATO.

MODIANO (TIMES): I beg your pardon, but even if Greece is out of the military wing, there is also the political wing from which you will have to withdraw. Second, on the question of the American bases, the agreement has not expired, it is only being reviewed.

A. PAPANDREU: It has expired. There is a specific period, Mr. Modiano. Those agreements do not last forever.

MODIANO (TIMES): I believe they are renewed unless denounced.

A. PAPANDREU: No, that's not so. Today the bases are not operating legally. Ask the government. I am sure they will give you the same answer. However, Mr. Modiano correctly stated that our withdrawal from the military wing of NATO is only one aspect of the issue because there is also the question of our withdrawal from the political wing. PASOK believes in a non-aligned, independent, Greek policy. Let me repeat all I have said in the Chamber of Deputies and to all of you--what we have suffered by being in this alliance is enough to convince any citizen. I think there was a recent poll which showed how great a majority of the Greek people wants the end of our relations with NATO.

KIRY K. STUMBLIS (AVG): The question raised by our colleague brought to my mind the recent report issued by the American senators who visited Greece last spring and its references to your meeting with them. At one point they say that during the meeting you expounded on your neutralist philosophy...

A. PAPANDREOU: I don't think "neutralist" was the word used...

KIRY K. STUMBLIS (AVG): And that, in any event, you assured them that on the question of bilateral or collective agreements you will move gradually, thereby giving the impression that in some way you are not going to torpedo from one day to the next these agreements of the government with NATO, but only gradually. I would like to know if this reflects your position.

A. PAPANDREOU: I will give the phrase I used. You can interpret it as you wish. "We will give you the opportunity to leave with every honor." This is what I said, but of course they did not report it.

DIEPSEN (German News Agency): You foresee elections this fall. Of course, you and PASOK wish to have elections. For what reason do you think the government will hold elections prematurely or will be forced to do so?

A. PAPANDREOU: Because of the prospect of a rapid deterioration of the economy starting this fall.

AVRAMOPOULOS (ESTIA, MAKEDONIA, THESSALONIKI): I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if what you said about the bases and NATO applies to the European Economic Community (EEC) as well.

A. PAPANDREOU: No, in the case of EOK we must have a plebiscite. We don't recognise that the Chamber of Deputies has the right to commit the country, even if the chamber is actually representative. We are asking for nothing more than what was done in Norway, Denmark, Ireland and even Britain. Let the Greek people express their will. This is our position on the question of the EEC.

SOURNELI (French Agency): A brief question. Is there any news about the meeting of the five socialist parties in Kerkyra?

A. PAPANDREOU: Not yet, but there soon will be.

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PACIFIC DEMANDS BY SEAMEN REPORTED

Athens Ο ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΤΑΧΥΔΡΟΜΟΣ in Greek 3 Jul 80 p 41

(Article by Nikos Simos)

Text The new minister of the merchant marine, I. Fikioris, had his first contact with Greek seamen during a meeting in which the secretary general of the Panhellenic Seamen's Federation PNO, E. Saitis, and other members of the federation's presidium presented their demands--15 to be exact--which if met, in the opinion of the Greek seamen, will help our merchant marine to meet successfully the "international competition."

What are the seamen's demands? They primarily relate to their insurance protection. They are asking that:

1. The bill for minimum insurance protection of seamen which has been languishing in the Parliamentary Committee should be approved.
2. A fund for the Auxiliary Insurance of Seamen should be established. Already PNO has drafted at its own expense an actuarial study.
3. Legislative action on the question of mutual insurance should be taken.
4. A presidential decree should be issued on the medical and medicinal care provided by the Seaman's Home, with the simultaneous introduction of the principle of free selection of attending physician by the seaman.
5. The completion of the Merchant Marine Hospital should be speeded up.
6. The health services serving the seamen, both in the capital and in the provinces, should be staffed with the needed professional personnel.

The rest of the institutional reforms called for by our seamen include:

- a. Application of the special rules on the import of foreign exchange to the sum paid once by the Welfare Funds at the time a seaman retires.

- b. Broader representation of insured seamen on the boards of Welfare Funds.
- c. Establishment of an agency for family allowances. The participation of the shipowners is assured because it has been agreed upon as part of the collective agreement and equals 2 percent of a seamen's remuneration.
- d. It must be noted that the legislative treatment of this question is covered by the bill on minimum insurance protection which is pending in the Parliamentary Committee.
- e. Housing loans. The creation of an agency to provide housing loans to seamen was announced 2 years ago. But the matter did not move forward. In the opinion of PNO, it is necessary to coordinate the actions of the related agencies to put into effect this housing promise within 1980.
- f. The question of absentee ballots by seamen. PNO calls for speeding up the study and the submission of recommendations on this subject by the work team composed of officials from the Ministries of Interior and Merchant Marine.
- g. The seamen also call for an early formulation of the proposals to classify the seaman's job as hazardous.

Deceit?

One of the subjects concerning PNO is the protection of seamen in case--there are many--the shipowner is financially unreliable.

It may be noted that PNO, prior to the EEC advice for the creation of agencies designed to protect the payment of salaries and wages to recipients, had asked the ministry to establish a special account financed through a special contribution by the shipowners, to safeguard any payments owed to seamen by unreliable or insolvent shipowners.

Britain and Italy have asked to be exempted from this *(EDK suggestion)* but they have instituted other measures to protect the rights of seamen such as guarantees by shipowners.

The Ministry of Merchant Marine had certain reservations which PNO, using the Community (EEC) advice, considers as unjustified. At the meeting Minister Fikioris stated that "he would study the matter with the greatest attention and understanding its importance commands."

Yet only 24 hours later the ministry bureaucrats embarrassed Fikioris since it would have been too risky for him, having been recently elevated to a ministerial post, to go back on his categorical statement. In a meeting of the Consultative Committee at the Ministry of Coordination, the representative of the Ministry of Merchant Marine lined up with the views of the shipowners and asked for the exemption of the Greek seamen from the protection provided for in the EEC instructions.

The PNO administration immediately protested to Fikioris and asked for a reversal of the ministry's position, considering that by the time this issue of OLKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS would be out, the council of the appropriate EEC ministers will have already decided on the recommendations of the Greek government to adjust existing legislation to the Community (EEC) instructions to protect the workers from unreliable employers.

The necessity for accepting the PNO proposals "which are designed to protect the prestige of the Greek flag in EEC and internationally" has been noted by the Greek General Confederation of Labor.

Other Demands

PNO further asks:

- a. The removal from the Greek registry of all overaged and unseaworthy vessels after a systematic inspection in the context of the measures for the safety and protection of the life of seamen.
- b. The strict implementation for the same reasons as above of the regulations concerning the composition of crews with a complete check of diplomas and certificates.
- c. The systematic conduction of inspections to determine the seaworthiness of vessels and to implement the regulations concerning the working conditions and food for the crews.

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REPORTER ANALYZES ECONOMIC SITUATION

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 3 Jul 80 pp 9,10,43

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou: "A Fall in Wage-Earners' Purchasing Power Will Mark 1980"]

[Text] One after the other, the basic branches of the Greek economy are being damaged by the recession. After construction, the recession has now spread into industrial production (which remained stationary during the first five months of 1980) while, in the sectors of circulation of goods and services, the crisis has harmed commerce and tourism.

Despite the Greek economy's entry into the recession tunnel, its basic circumstantial problems, like high inflation and the great deficit in foreign exchanges, not only have not been blunted but, conversely, have been aggravated. The New Democracy government, which had chosen the model of restricting demand in order to "freeze" inflation and reduce the gap in the balance of payments, sees--like the apprentice magician--with astonishment that the classic formulas have yielded nothing. The new government of G. Rallis, with the liberal ministers who direct its economic policy, would not hesitate at all to change this policy and proceed in strengthening supply if it had some accommodation for manipulations. Unfortunately, however, the balance of payments has been aggravated so much that the margins for changes are very limited; the government, if it actually intends to change policies, is obligated to proceed with very timid and hesitant steps if it does not want, one beautiful morning, to see the balance completely upset and thus be compelled to turn as suppliant to the International Monetary Fund and accept the harsh reform terms which it will impose (drastic devaluation, dismissals, unemployment, etc.).

There are many explanations for the paradoxical phenomenon of the economy being found in full conditions of recession and yet the deficit in the balance of payments not decreasing. Thus, according to one explanation, in the last two years, as a result of the strict income policy exercised but also the slackening of the economy's rate of development, we had an aggravation of unequal income distribution (terms and amounts are reported in a Bank of Greece study about which we write more below), with the

result that participation in the national income of classes whose demand revolves around domestic products was decreased.

Conversely, the share of those classes who, in both the consumer and investment prototype, are oriented to imports was increased. Thus, if to the incomes of these upper and middle classes are also added those incomes which escape taxation as well as those created in the para-economy, we have a very strong demand which swells imports, irregardless of whether the economy is in a recession or not.

On the other hand, the government, which does not conceal the criticalness of the balance of payments situation (it is characteristic that the bitter cup of announcements about its progress was presented to the vice-governor of the Bank of Greece, G. Drakos) maintains that its problem is no longer imports. These, under the effect of the recession, have been immobilized and are not going to present unpleasant surprises, at least until the end of the year. The balance of payments problem is being created in the present phase by two factors, oil and the capital outflow or the suspension of influx of capital. Relative to this, the government cites that:

In the first four months of 1980, if payments for oil procurement are deducted, the remaining imports were limited to 2,448 million dollars versus 2,426 million dollars in the same period of 1979; that is, they remained essentially fixed (an increase in value of only 0.9 percent, hence a decrease in volume).

On the other hand, the balance for fuels ended, in the first four months, with a deficit of 965 million dollars, versus a deficit of 560 million dollars in the same period of 1979.

Moreover, in the first four months of 1980, other revenues brought in 1,476 million dollars, versus 1,391 million dollars and 1,127 dollars in the same period of 1979 and 1978. That is, the rate of increase in invisible revenues fell in 1980 to 6.1 percent, versus 23.4 percent, and specifically as concerns immigrant remittances, it was decreased by 10.4 percent, while last year it had increased by 10.9 percent.

This poor progress of our exchange earnings is due to the abundant exporting of capital and the fact that, conversely, firstly maritime and secondly tourist and immigrant exchange are not coming into Greece to cover this exporting. In order for this drain to be dealt with, the government proceeded, in its last decision, to increase interest rates only for large depositors who entrust their money to Greek banks for a period of more than one year (since 1 July those who deposit with a commitment of at least one year will receive up to 22 percent, the maximum ceiling). The government thought that those who are taking their money out are those who have large deposits. So it left unchanged interest rates on savings deposits (up to 13.5 percent when inflation runs to 25 percent) and, conversely, it

increased the interest rate on large fixed deposits from 16 to 22 percent. On the other hand, a mini "amnesty" was given to those who agree to bring into the country exchange which they had exported secretly; also, interest rates which are 2.5 units higher than those on the open market were given.

Certainly, the very high interest rates, combined with the drop in interest rates abroad, are a strong lure. But we must not forget that what drove the capital to be taken out was not so much a search for a better return as the bad psychological climate here and the undermining of the saver's feeling of security.

If repatriation of capital is not achieved with these measures, the government will be forced, slowly or quickly, to rescind all the existing restrictions on exchange. Immediate repeal of restrictions existing today has already been sought by the president of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Lazaros Efraimoglou, who explained that the measure must be combined with the possibility of free possession and movement of foreign exchange by Greeks and foreigners and with free opening of bank accounts (deposits) with interest rates analogous to the current rates on international money markets.

Worker's Wages

A Bank of Greece study on worker's wages and the income policy which has just been composed (by Isaak Sambethai) reveals that:

The fall in the purchasing power of wage-earners, which began in 1979, will be continued in 1980 at a swifter rate. More specifically, on the basis of available data (up to 10 June 1980) it is estimated that the median worker's wages will increase in 1980 by 20.6 percent. As a result, the purchasing power of the median wage-earner will be decreased by 3.5 percent since, according to recent forecasts, the median yearly increase in consumer prices will reach 25 percent. In fact, for certain categories of wage-earners, the loss in purchasing power will be greater (approximately five percent). On the other hand, in 1979, the median worker's wages increased by 18.6 percent (purchasing power -0.3 percent) while in 1978 the increase was 21.8 percent (purchasing power +8.2 percent).

A result of the above development is the fact that there will be a decrease this year also in the participation of "domestic" wages and salaries in the non-agricultural gross national product (1980: 50.9 percent, 1979: 51.0 percent, 1978: 51.9 percent). This decrease would be--because of the serious decline in purchasing power--even greater if at the same time a decrease in the real non-agricultural gross national product was not anticipated.

The increases by category of wage-earners (final estimates for 1979 and forecasts for 1980) are as follows:

Civil Servants: Median gross salaries were increased by approximately 20 percent in 1979, while purchasing power increased by 0.8 percent. For 1980, it is estimated that median gross wages will be increased by 19.1 percent--far less, that is, than the cost of living.

Public Service Enterprises: For all of the four basic public service enterprises (OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization], DEI [Public Power Corporation], ELTA [Greek Posts] and OSE [Railways Organization of Greece]) median gross salaries of their employees were increased in 1979 by 21.7 percent (2.3 percent increase in purchasing power) while they will be increased by 20 percent in 1980.

Bank Employees: During 1979, the increase in the median gross salaries of bank employees reached 13.5 percent which means that their purchasing power was decreased by 4.6 percent. For 1980, it is estimated that median gross salaries will be increased by 19.7 percent.

Major Industry: According to the sample study of ESYE [National Statistical Service of Greece] in major industry, in 1979, hourly (gross) worker salaries were increased by 20.6 percent (purchasing power +1.3 percent), weekly worker salaries by 20.4 percent (purchasing power +1.2 percent)--because of the decrease in the median working time by 0.2 percent--and monthly employee salaries by 18.6 percent (purchasing power -0.3 percent). For 1980, hourly salaries will be increased by 25.5 percent, weekly salaries by 24.2 percent and employee salaries by 22 percent.

Unskilled Workers: It is estimated that the median increase for all unskilled workers with the lowest salaries was 17.9 percent (purchasing power -0.9 percent) while for 1980 it will be 21.2 percent.

Other Categories: It is estimated that, for 1980, median gross salaries of wage-earners on urban and interurban bus lines will be increased by 18.1 percent, store-clerks by 21.9 percent, employees of A.E. [corporation] offices and private enterprises by 20.9 percent, accountants by 19.9 percent and construction workers by 18 percent.

Consequently, with the exception of workers in major industry, in all the other categories of workers, the purchasing power of their salaries will be decreased since the increase in gross salaries falls short of the rise in the cost of living.

The Bank of Greece study notes that the rate of the increase in the cost of labor per product unit will be significantly accelerated in 1980, due to the combination of two factors: the quickening of the rate of increase of the median worker's wages (which is a reaction to the 1979 inflationary elevation) and the forecasted decrease in production and--correspondingly--productivity.

More specifically, the median worker's wages will be increased by 20.6 percent, after the relative restraint which had been observed in the previous year (1979: 18.6 percent, 1978: 21.8 percent). The total of "domestic" wages and salaries (in which is not included the net workers' income from abroad) will also be increased by 20.6 percent. These data imply that occupation of wage-earners in the urban sector will remain fixed in 1980, while it had increased by 2.5 percent in 1979 and 2.2 percent in 1978.

On the other hand, according to recent estimations of the department of forecasts, the non-agricultural gross national product will be decreased by 1.5 percent in 1980 (1979: 5 percent, 1978: 5.7 percent). As a result, it appears that the cost of labor per product unit will be increased by 22.5 percent (1979: 15.8 percent, 1978: 17.8 percent) while productivity per wage-earner will be decreased by 1.5 percent (1979: 2.4 percent, 1978: 3.4 percent).

As Sambethai observes, these data give the impression of fixed thoughts about the role of the worker's wages in the inflationary process of the last two years. The significant acceleration of inflation in 1979 (median increase of 19 percent, increase between the beginning and end of the year of 24.8 percent) coincided with an important retardation in the rate of increase of labor costs (from 17.8 percent in 1978 to 15.8 percent in 1979) which was achieved thanks to a strict income policy. This policy had been based on a forecasted 10-percent increase in prices and it was not revised all during 1979 despite the fact that the forecasts did not come true.

The great increase in prices during 1979 was due, in fact, to other factors: principally, to the increase in liquid fuels, the raising of subsidy prices on certain agricultural products, and the increase in prices of certain public utility services (in the frameworks of the policy for decrease in the deficits of the corresponding organizations).

There is no doubt that during the current year, the quantitative "contribution" of labor costs to the increase in prices will be greater. This year's acceleration in the rate of increase in labor costs cannot, however, be considered an "autonomous" factor of inflation for two reasons:

The acceleration is due to the greater--in relation to last year--increase in the median worker's wages, which is a direct product of the need to cover the decrease in purchasing power during 1979, as well as the reasonable inflationary expectations which the decrease inspired in wage-earners for this year. Secondly, the acceleration in labor costs would be much smaller, or even non-existent, if an increase in productivity on the order of four percent was anticipated.

The conclusion is that the anti-inflationary policy undoubtedly must also strive to restrain the increase in labor costs. For this ambition to be realized, however, the effort to check the increase in the median worker's

wages is completely inefficient (aside from the fact that it is contrary to certain points: the need to maintain the wage-earner's purchasing power). In the present phase of the economic juncture, restriction of labor costs (and its effect on the inflationary process) can primarily arise from increase in productivity (and from measures which would promote the achievement of this target).

The Ministry of Coordination's Directorate of National Accounts published the text which includes the provisional national accounts for Greece during 1979 (which have been sent provisionally only to the ministers and other factors). However, the work is always attended to and year by year is improved with the addition of new indicators, thus offering the studier all the necessary data for expanding and evaluating our economic developments.

Certainly, the data for 1979 are more or less well-known since they have already been used by the governor of the Bank of Greece in his report, but it is useful for us to add certain findings of the General Directorate about developments in 1979:

Final national demand was increased in 1979 by 3.3 percent, while it had increased by 5.0 percent in 1978 and 5.8 percent in 1977. Particularly significant was the slackening of private demand for consumer goods and services (1979: 2.5 percent, 1978: 5.4 percent). This development resulted in the contribution of the increase in private consumption to the increase in the gross national product being decreased from 62.9 percent in 1978 to 44.9 percent in 1979. Conversely, little acceleration was shown by the rate of increase in demand for investment goods by private enterprise and households, and in demand of the public sector.

The real gross national income at factor cost was increased in 1979 by 3.7 percent, while it had increased by 5.5 percent in 1978 and 3.3 percent in 1977. It is estimated that the per capita gross national income reached 3,661 dollars at market prices in 1979.

Gross investments of fixed capital, at fixed 1970 prices, were increased in 1979 by 4.9 percent, versus 4.7 percent in 1978 and 7.8 percent in 1977. This development in investments was a result of the increase both in private investments (4.8 percent) and public investments (5.3 percent). A result of the above changes in investment expenditure during this year is the improvement in private activity's contribution to the increase in investments as compared to the previous year (1979: 75.5 percent, 1978: 67.9 percent) and the corresponding weakening of the contribution of public activity (1979: 24.5 percent, 1978: 32.1 percent).

Finally, the observation about the deterioration of trade conditions has special value. Actually, in 1979 the trade deficit was increased in comparison to 1970 by 130,848 million drachmas; analysis of this shows that, of this amount, 125,050 million drachmas--95.6 percent of the total expenditure--is owing exclusively to unfavorable trade conditions, while the changes in quantities of imported and exported goods amount to 5,798 million drachmas and are 4.4 percent of the change versus the 1970 trade balance deficit.

PECI DETAILS RED BRIGADES' CONTACTS, ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS

Summary of Testimony

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 28 Apr 80 pp 40-44

[Article by Pino Buongiorno and Antonio Padalino : "BR/End of the Law of Silence (Omerta): The Confession"]

[Text] What made Patrizio Peci decide to talk? What did Gen Alberto Dalla Chiesa promise him? What rents have been torn in the armed party? With the answers to these questions comes a certainty: For the BRs, the countdown to ruin has begun.

It will go down in history as "the Cambiano encounter." It was in the carabinieri barracks in this tiny town, 18 kilometers outside Turin, that Patrizio Peci, one of the leaders of the Red Brigades, and General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa first laid eyes on one another on Thursday 20 March, as the terrorist was being moved from one prison to another.

Eyeball to eyeball, in a bare little room with the general, Peci seemed dazed, confused. He wanted to talk, but asked for guarantees. What would become of him? Could he get out of life imprisonment? Who would protect him in prison and outside? The general made no promises. At least not at first. He did, however, let it be known that a full confession, complete with names and facts and specific charges would mean something good for the Brigades leader, and that was enough to elicit precisely that. It was almost a bargaining session, and it lasted several hours.

Dalla Chiesa knew he could count on Peci's breaking, psychologically and physically. He had that word from the Cuneo superprison where Peci had been held in total isolation since Tuesday 19 February, the day he was arrested among the concessions in a Turin amusement park. The terrorist had gone through continual fits of

depressions, he kept often in despair, and exchanged melodramatic surges of conversation with prison guards. He was crushed by the law, a 4-month sentence handed down for possession of a pistol in Turin, but far more terrified at the certainty of a life sentence at hard labor he would get when he went to trial on the far more serious charges still pending.

This is why he decided to tell all. And Dalla Chiesa grabbed at the chance. That day in Cambiano the Red Brigades suffered a crucial blow, perhaps the most serious since Silvano Girotto, the emissary from Dalla Chiesa himself had sent out to infiltrate Renato Curcio's hard-core founding nucleus.

As proof of good faith, Peci offered a first sample of information: in Genoa, on Via Fracchia, there was a hideout of the elusive Genoa column. That was the signal for the start of the military operation of 27 March, in the course of which the Carabinieri killed four Brigade members, including two from the Strategic Directorate: Riccardo Dura (that was "comrade Roberto") and Lorenzo Betassa ("comrade Antonio"). The Red Brigades themselves admitted, in a pamphlet they distributed, that they had been struck to the heart.

To Dalla Chiesa this was proof enough that Peci was not just selling smoke: he knew things, and how! Now the thing was to get him to go on talking, this time before the magistrates. But he had to be given something in exchange, too. The general talked with Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga. This exceptional case (this was the first time that the secrets of the Red Brigades had been revealed by one of their own leaders) called for exceptional measures. Even a pardon. But how could a pardon be granted quickly? According to current laws, it takes a long time (the final sentence must have been passed, and that usually comes only after extenuating appeals and counterpleas, not to mention the forgiveness of the victims' families and an investigation that usually takes years).

Cossiga was immediately ready to do whatever he could; he put his legislative staff to work on finding a quicker and less cumbersome procedure (dropping the final sentencing requirement, for instance). The Prime Minister slipped a remark about it into his platform statement: "We shall also be studying a different procedure for moving directly to pardons which, apart from the President's prerogative, provides for a broader set of circumstances in which pardon may be granted." Not everybody caught the significance of Cossiga's words. Peci was one of the few to grasp what they meant: they were also a message to him.

Pardon, though, was not quite enough for him. Did he also ask for safe-conduct out of the country, and a foreign bank account? Subsidi is ready to make any comment on this score, even though,

as somebody in the Turin D.A.'s office remarked, "they've built golden bridges for Peci." It is certain that they promised immunity for his friend, Maria Giovanna Massa, a 23-year-old nurse, who escaped on 18 January of this year from the hideout on the Corso Lecce in Turin: it all goes well, he will soon be able to meet her abroad.

Handled with kid gloves by the general and by the politicians, reassured again by the magistrates in Turin and Rome who took custody of him from Dalla Chiesa, Peci told all: his 4 years (beginning in December '70) in the BRs, his rapid climb through the organization's ranks until he was promoted to head the Turin column after the capture of Raffaele Fiore on 19 March 1970, the group's table of organization and the bloody account of its gravest crimes, from the murder of Judge Francesco Coco in Genoa to the slaughter on Via Fani to the execution-slaying of Aldo Moro.

Did he turn informer only to get out of prison alive? Peci gave the magistrates a different version, a moral reason, if you will. "I have come to understand that armed struggle is a losing game. When it's over, there is nothing but death, terror, and blood," he said, for example, to a Roman judge. He seems, in short, to have experienced an awakening of conscience, as he told his mother, Amelia, in a letter from prison.

To find the key to Patrizio Peci's capitulation, though, we must look primarily at his personal history. Born in San Benedetto del Tronto to a building contractor father and a housewife mother, whose own record of active participation in the Resistance is a matter of great pride to him (his country cottage was a refuge for many partisans), Peci got his first taste of politics in Lotta Continua, which is very active in that region.

Shy, introverted, emotional: even when he was passing out handbills, his friends from those days remember, he showed how insecure he was. Further evidence that he had problems and was encountering difficulties is his sudden decision to drop out of the Istituto Industriale in his 4th year. After that he worked as a waiter during the long Adriatic summer, then found a job in a small factory in Milan, from '73 to '74/

That was his qualitative leap. In the big city he almost certainly made his first contacts with Mario Moretti, who was to become the BRs' Scarlet Pimpernel, a man to whom Peci was drawn because of their common roots in the Marches.

When he went back to San Benedetto he was a different person. "I didn't know him any more, he had turned so tough, so hard," said Nazareno Torquari, a seaman who had been close to him for years.

The little kid who was never in the front row, never scolded for fighting or violence, suddenly began to practice what was defined in those days as "militant antifascism."

In July '75 he took part in a street brawl with a gang of fascists, "a political reprisal, from which he would have stayed far, far away in the old days," said Torquati. This was when Peci began to find his feet as an organizer and minor leader. He set up the first "Autonomie Operaie" (Workers' Autonomous) group in San Benedetto, even though nobody really saw him, in those days any more than now, as possessing the political stature of a leader. "ideologically he had no background at all. He couldn't even write a handbill," say his friends. "How he ever got into an organization so ironbound and demanding as the BRs is still a mystery to us."

And in fact, even when, at the end of December '76, he went underground, after the accidental discovery of terrorist weapons and documents in an apartment he used to visit, Peci seems to have been driven by circumstances rather than by any specific choice of sides. He said as much to his mother on the telephone, but promised that sooner or later he would give himself up.

As things turned out, though, Peci rose quickly in the BRs. And that, too, is a mystery to his friends in San Benedetto. "A guy like Peci is a corporal at most; he actually believed that he could make a career in the BRs 'Italian-style,' counting on nothing but friendship, loyalty, and home-town ties with the bosses," says Giustino Zazzetta, a former member of Lotta Continua.

Further Details

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 5 May 80 pp 55-58

Article by Pino Buongiorno and Antonio Padalino: "Moro: This Is How It Went"

Text Patrizio Peci is still talking. Now he reveals the backstage secret of how the BRs organized the kidnapping of the DC president, and involves other big names directly in the affair. Is it all true?

It was the autumn of '77. In a Red Brigades hideout in Lombardy the top brass of the terrorist organization was gathering for a meeting of the executive committee (CE). On hand were Mario Moretti, the unchallenged strategist for military operations, Lauro Azzolini, Franco Bonisoli, and Rocco Micaletto. They were the men who had taken over from Renato Curcio and Alberto Francesco Ceschini, who had been in prison for some time, and from Mara Cagol, who was killed by the Carabinieri in 1975.

The terrorist campaign the four men at the BR summit were planning was unprecedented. It was to mark the high point of the stab at the heart of the state. "Get the men and the hideouts of the DC, the powerhouses of imperialist restructuring," was the watchword that went out to the four BR columns in Milan, Turin, Genoa, and Rome. The columns would be free to pick which of the Christian Democrats would be their target. When and how this was to be done would be determined by the Strategy Directorate. Three names came back from the BR rank and file. The Turin column nominated right-wing Christian Democrat Giuseppe Costamagna, known almost solely for his utterly unpredictable and abstruse questions from the floor, presented in a continuous stream. He was clearly a very small target. The BR Strategy Directorate scratched him, and taxed the Turin Brigade people with "provincialism."

Down in Rome, though, they were aiming high. At Giulio Andreotti, then head of a government the communists were getting ready to support, and Aldo Moro, president of the DC, the man who had actually inspired his party's opening to the PCI, a thing the BRs had always sworn they would block at any cost.

They weighed the pros and cons of both names for the military operation. Andreotti was all but untouchable: unlike Moro, he traveled in an armored car, lived in the heart of the downtown area, in a place where, once the ambush had been sprung, it would be very difficult to escape. The Moro house was on the outskirts of the city, in a maze of streets where it would be a simple matter to elude pursuit and get quickly into the hideaway.

The Strategy Directorate, the BR parliament, then consisting of 12 members, had no doubts. Moro had to be the victim.

In his confession Peci, the Brigade member who has just decided, after 4 years under ground, to collaborate with "the enemy," gave this explanation to the Turin and Rome prosecutors who are still questioning him about the preparations for the BR's most sensational coup.

At the center of things once again was his home-town friend and great protector, Mario Moretti. The Strategy Directorate entrusted him with the task of organizing, mounting, and winding up the Moro kidnaping. Via Fani was to be the moment of truth for all the Red Brigades. Slated to take part in it were all the column chiefs, who set aside their political squabbles and even the petty personal rivalries that had begun to surface within the organization. From Milan came Azzolini, from Turin came Rafaële Fiore, and Genoa sent Rocco Micaletto.

Helping to make sure the plan worked, according to Peci, were the 100 or so "irregulars" attached to the Roman column. These were

the people who, under the direction of the elusive Moretti, prepared the ground, snaffled equipment, and stood by to pass out handbills. The author of these leaflets, Peci swears, was always Moretti: nobody else. He was also Moro's Grand Inquisitor, while Prospero Gallinari, deputy chief of the Roman column, was in charge of guarding the prisoner. But where was the "prisoner of the people?" Peci, who still swears he was not on Via Fani because at the time he was only the number three man in the Turin column (after Fiore and Nadia Ponte), replied: "Moretti told me he was held in the back room of a shop just outside Rome."

Though Moretti was everywhere and into everything, the Strategy Directorate, which according to Peci held frequent meetings, probably in Florence, still held the most important role: to exercise political control over the phases of the kidnaping, and send out orders for diversionary attacks in other cities. Most important of all, it had to approve the "resolution" sent out in April, along with communique number 4. The story of that document confirms the links between the founding nucleus and the latest generation of terrorists. According to Peci, Curcio and the others had made a substantial contribution to drafting the resolution, managing to get a whole series of analyses and studies slipped out of the superprisons.

Even so BR unity, apparently inviolable, was plunged into crisis by the Moro case. Peci reveals, with hitherto unknown details, the case of Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, the two BR members who were killed by the organization for opposition to the line adopted during the time Moro was being held (according to these two, and there is mention as well of another "five dissident comrades," the BRs had "cut themselves off from the movement," by behaving like nothing but "warlords." With ideas of death, and that's all.)

When did the break come with the BR summit, which Morucci denounced as a "non-Stalinist bureaucracy"? Before or after Moro was executed? Peci did not say. He does say, though, that his expulsion certainly came after Moro was killed.

The BR's response to Morucci criticisms, according to Peci, was to send a member of the executive committee to Rome for an inquiry. Next day, two Brigade members from the Roman column ordered Morucci and Faranda to compile an "inventory" of all weapons, documents, and money in their possession. They then ordered the pair to go to the "border," which, Peci explains, meant to a place far from Rome, and to stay there for a while pending final decisions. Instead of following orders, Morucci and Faranda suddenly disappeared from their hideout, taking with them all the equipment. In the deserted apartment the Brigade searchers found only a caustically ironic message: "No to police detention!"

This was too much for Moretti and company. The two ex-BR people would have to be put to death. "They are thieves and profiteers," was the word that began to make the rounds. Let no-one try to help them, even outside the BRs.

It was in this connection that Peci recounted a detail not thus far made public, a disconcerting bit of information that sheds still more sinister light on the A.O. and on its ties with the armed groups. Said Peci: "Several comrades from the Rome column talked about the Morucci issue with the three top chiefs. They warned them not to have anything to do with the traitors, or to find them any place to hide." Who are these three "big chiefs," as Peci calls them? "Franco Piperno, Lanfranco Pace, and Oreste Scalzone," was Peci's unhesitating reply to the investigators. "They went to the bosses partly because we had already heard rumors that someone was stirring up our internal disagreements. In short, there was a suspicion that there were people hoping to use this business in an attempt to take over BR leadership from outside."

Reacting to this astonishing special effect dropped into the middle of Peci's confession, the investigators recovered enough to ask: "Did you go to see Negri, too?" "No," replied Peci, "because we didn't think he had anything to do with this business." "But," urged the D.A., "Negri did telephone to Moro at his house?" "Moretti told me that he made the call."

On Negri, Peci would only add, in a sybilline tone, "From what I heard and from looking at some of the documents distributed by Prima Linea, we decided that Negri was not one of the top men."

This was Peci's last word. Is everything he says believable? The magistrates, against all the odds, are struggling to pick out of this flood of confession what is real fact and what is not.

The thing that will be hardest to pinpoint, on the basis of the new information from Peci, is the point at which initial contact was made between Morucci and the "big three." Was it perhaps before Moro was killed? If that were the case, it might explain the attempt by Piperno and Pace to induce socialist leaders to negotiate with the BRs. Was it Morucci, the dissident Brigade man, who suggested the whole thing?

Testimony Implicates Others

Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 4 May 80 p 7

Article by Guido Guidi: "BR Members Piancone and Micaletto Charged With the Via Fani Massacre" /

[Text] Magistrates are still sorting out the results of the inquiry into the Moro case. They will need a week to 10 days to decide whether or not to revoke the warrant for arrest out on Piperno and Pace. Peci called the two A.O. men "big bosses."

Rome, 3 May. -- Franco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace will still have some days to wait: before they decide whether or not to revoke the arrest warrants on which the pair were arrested last summer in Paris and extradited to Italy (charges were the massacre on Via Fani and the murder of Aldo Moro), the prosecutors are planning to press on with other inquiries, which will take them another 7 to 10 days. Slated for questioning are at least four people: Socialist MPs Craxi and Signorile, who will be asked if it was indeed Piperno and Pace who took the initiative in meeting with PSI leaders to propose negotiating with the BR to save Moro's life, or if it was the other way around; Giuliana Conforto, to get a better look at her offer of hospitality in her house on Viale Giulio Cesare to Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, at the request of Piperno and Pace; and lastly, Patrizio Peci, who tagged the two as "big bosses," whom the BR warned not to offer assistance to the "dissident" BR members. "When we have heard them all," said a Palazzo di Giustizia spokesman, "a decision will be made."

While the inquiry centering on Piperno and Pace has actually come to a halt or at least been pushed onto a back burner (if that arrest warrant is revoked, it will mean that both must be freed forthwith, although they will still be under indictment for armed insurrection, because France extradited them only on the first count, but not on the second), the prosecutors are reshuffling their list of suspects or presumed suspects in the kidnaping, and murder of Aldo Moro. It is not an easy job, even though Patrizio Peci's non-stop recitative has somewhat simplified it.

Warrants were issued yesterday for the arrest of Raffaele Fiore, former captain of the Piedmont column, and for Luca Nicolotti, a Genoese worker-student involved in the Genoa ambush of Col Emanuele Tuttobene and Cpl Antonio Casu, both of the Carabinieri; two more were handed down today for Cristofaro Piancone and Rocco Micaletto. Three have already been in custody for some time and one, Nicolotti, has been a fugitive since the time of the Via Fani massacre.

Rocco Micaletto was recently arrested in Turin along with Patrizio Peci, but unlike his friend, he has steadfastly refused to talk, and the day before Attorney Sergio Spazzali was arrested and Attorney Arnaldi killed himself, he insisted that he

was being held as a political prisoner in Venice where he was to be tried on lesser charges. Peci did not have to talk to lend validity to the charges against him: prosecutors have long been certain that he was involved in the attack on Moro and that, among other things, it was he who had put up the money to buy the printshop on Via Foa in Rome where the BRs had their handbills and communiqus printed while they were holding the president of the Christian Democrat party prisoner.

Cristofaro Piancone is the fourth man on the new list the prosecutors are scrutinizing: another arrest warrant. His is not a new name, and he has been in prison since 14 April 1978 when he was wounded and captured in Turin right after having ambushed and slain prison guard Lorenzo Cotugno. He is 30 years old, and was born in Grenoble, though his family comes from Sorato in Apulia. He managed to get a job at FIAT, but was fired for absenteeism in 1974; he succeeded in getting his job back, but was fired again 2 years later, this time for good; after that he vanished without a trace.

Cristofaro Piancone is not a new name but, according to the Carabinieri -- he is not a very big name in the terrorist lineup. How in the world he rose to head the commando on Via Fani the morning of 16 March 1978 is a mystery: not even a month had passed before he was arrested. The unfortunate Lorenzo Cotugno managed to squeeze off a shot before he died, and wounded Piancone.

From the moment of his arrest, Piancone has remained resolutely silent, speaking only to claim repeatedly that he considers himself a "political prisoner." In Rome, there is not much hope that he will change his mind, but there is still a glimmer. "Who would have thought," they say, "that Patrizio Peci, for instance, could turn out to be such a help in the investigation?"

Patrizio Peci explained the motives that drove him to tell all a few weeks after his arrest in Turin. They are of two kinds, and quite disparate. The first: "I asked to talk to a magistrate after I found out that the Attorney General's Office, several cabinet departments, or even the President can make allowances for cooperative behavior if they want to." The second: "Today I am impelled to criticize what the [BR] organization planned to do. I have in fact come to the certainty that our struggle, the struggle of the Red Brigades and the armed struggle as a whole means nothing but harm to the working class. On the basis of this realization I decided to ask for an immediate meeting with an officer of the court."

Moro Kidnapping Plans, Execution

Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 5 May 80 p 6

[Article by Guido Guidi: "Peci Tells of Moro's Last Hours"]

[Text] Contrite terrorist turns spotlight full on the slaughter on Via Fani. DC president faced death with great calm and dignity. He somehow found the inner strength to say goodbye to his jailers shortly before he was murdered. Terrorists tore up some of the statesman's letters to his family. A.O. activists Pace, Pianino, and Scalzone accused. "Roman column" still running smoothly. Major terrorist nest in the Veneto region.

Rome, 4 May -- Aldo Moro was certain that he was going to be killed on the morning of 9 May 1978, when he was taken out of his prison ("in a shop outside Rome, but not far from it"), where he had been held for 55 days, and bundled into the trunk of the maroon Renault 4 which the Brigade people later abandoned, with his corpse in the trunk, on Via Caetani. He faced death with great calm and dignity.

Patrizio Peci knows nothing about those tragic hours at first hand, because he was in Turin and because he was excluded, he claims, from all major decisions; he recounted what he says he was told by Raffaele Fiore, former leader of the BR's Piedmont column, who reportedly chose Peci as his confidant.

Aldo Moro -- according to Patrizio Peci's testimony, found the inner strength to bid farewell to his jailers, who were destined shortly to become his murderers, on that morning of 9 May 1978, and, missing one face among them, left a farewell for Mario Moretti, who had questioned him day after day; before leaving his cell, he handed the terrorists "several letters, in which he expressed his last wishes as to the disposition of this or that bit of personal property to several family members," saying that "his fountain pen should be delivered or at least left to a niece, I think it was Tittina." Again according to Peci, these letters were torn up, and Moro's last will and testament was not executed. Nobody knows what malice drove Raffaele Fiore not to deliver those last messages. Also burnt was the formal will Moro had drafted during his imprisonment, along with all the other writings in the DC president's own hand, which were, Peci hastened to say, "devoid of any political interest at all."

"They talked about it in a column meeting" said Patrizio Peci, explaining why the material was taken from Rome to Piedmont, "because there was still a sizable BR arms depot in the Biella zone," and they couldn't decide what to do with it. Should the

logistics support center be taken, simply having the stuff there would be a defeat by reason of the simple fact that this was material evidence in the Moro kidnaping. On the other hand -- was the cynical observation: "The stuff was of no real use to us, and so we decided to burn it all."

The Via Fani ambush had been planned and rehearsed in minutest detail for 4 or 5 months; Moro's habits were watched, and the BR even assigned a man to make sure that the windows of his car were not bulletproof. There were repeated recce missions on Via Fani, and Adriana Faranda drove the kidnap car. At last Mario Moretti decided that the time had come to spring the trap: the execut ~~ve~~ commando -- let's call it that, because there were at least 100 in the supporting cast -- consisted of Mario Moretti who, as head of the organization, was mainly concerned with the setup and planning, but would not be packing a gun; Valerio Morucci, Adriana Faranda, Prospero Gallinari, Lauro Azzolini, Bonisoli, and Raffaele Fiore, who fired only two bursts because his M-12 machinegun jammed, plus two more BR members whose names Peci initially could not, or would not, recall; a few days later he said that they were Lorenzo Nicolotti from Turin and Cristofaro Piancone, a French-born son of parents in Apulia and a former FIAT worker.

Rocco Micaletto, head of the Genoa column, according to Peci, was also one of the men responsible for the Via Fani massacre because he was a member of the BR executive committee along with Moretti, Bonisoli, and Azzolini, who organized the killing and brought it off. It added up to nine men and a woman, plus nine cars and a towtruck on standby.

Once his bodyguards had been slain, Aldo Moro was removed from his car to another, and Raffaele Fiore was the one who actually did this; after that, the DC president was bundled into a trunk and loaded onto a truck, which carried him to the prison where, according to statements attributed partly to Peci and partly to Fiore, with bits from other BR members, he was subjected to lengthy sessions of interrogation.

"He was told," said Peci, "that if he would denounce the scandals of the system, such as the real story behind the Piazza Fontana massacre, he would certainly be set free. Although he agreed that most of his party's spokesmen were 'sharks,' Mr Moro always behaved with dignity or valiantly defended the DC's function as protector of the people and, insofar as the Piazza Fontana killings were concerned, denied that any prominent Christian Democrats had had a hand in it directly.." Moro was also asked to reveal some state secrets, but his answers to such questions were invariably vague, and in any case not nearly adequate by Brigade standards.

Equally vague are Peci's charges against Negri, although they do deserve some attention ("We believed Negri was in direct contact with Prima Linea in the sense that he used to give guidelines to that organization, and we in the BR in Turin reached that conclusion through an analysis of the things he would write as compared with what Prima Linea would then do..."). More specific, however, are his incriminations of Franco Piperno, Lanfranco Pace, and Oreste Scalzone, because, Peci admits, there is "a matchup between the details of the massacre [of Moro's bodyguards] and the kidnaping and the plans published in the Autonomia periodical."

Peci's revelations have been a great help (or at least the police hope so) in "unhinging" the BR structures in Turin and Genoa; that still leaves the Roman column, which, numerically, was and still is the biggest, with its cells "in the railroads, in the hospitals, in the university, and in the telephone company." Patrizio Peci does not know the names or real identities of its members: all he can provide is their noms de guerre, and the prosecutors, Carabinieri, and Digos people are working on those, while a search is afoot in the Veneto for a hideout where there is supposed to be a record of all BR documents carefully recorded on microfilm.

Can we put much stock in Patrizio Peci? The prosecutors are still cautiously optimistic: true, the terrorist seems to have repented of his ways (and that is why he decided to talk), because -- he says -- "our struggle" had dwindled to "a war between us and the state," the upshot of which was to "shrink those areas the working class had in fact already conquered on its own." True, Peci recounted in every minute detail no fewer than 35 operations, which are in fact 35 crimes in which he was an accessory, almost as if to highlight his sincerity by accusing himself along with everybody else. It is also true, however, that Peci's prime objective is to win not only a milder sentence in exchange for his confession; he actually hopes for a presidential pardon, so that he can, he says, "build a new life for himself in another country without fear of reprisals." Given conditions like those, this is a brand of sincerity that calls for the most searching scrutiny.

Red Brigades-Autonomy Links

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 7 May 80 p 3

[Text] Under questioning in Pescara prison by Calogero, Peci is pressured about ties between the Red Brigades and Autonomie Operaie. Interesting leads have already emerged on the alleged positions of Piperno, Pace, and Scalzone in the "armed party."

They are still questioning Patrizio Peci in Pescara prison. Yesterday it was the turn of Padua Deputy Prosecutor Guido Calogero. The magistrate arrived in this Abruzzi town with a colleague from the Padua prosecutor's office in an armored Alfetta at 0900 this morning. The two stayed in the prison until 1330. The questioning began again in the afternoon.

As to the main thrust of this round of questioning, we can only guess: the best guess is that the Paduan magistrates are interested in what the Autonomie Operaie organization was up to during the 55 days Aldo Moro was held captive. This is a point Peci touched on day before yesterday when he was questioned in Pescara prison by two Roman magistrates, D.A. Francesco Amato and Assistant D.A. Nicolo Amato, who have a keen interest in the role played during Moro's captivity by the Roman A.O. leaders, Francesco Piperno and Lanfranco Pace.

On the score of relations among the various subversive organizations, the penitent BR leader underlined the "feud" between the Roman A.O. and the Red Brigades. As readers will recall, two of the leaders, Pace and Piperno, are charged with complicity in the Moro kidnaping as well as with insurrection against the state, a charge lodged against other A.O. types as well, including Toni Negri.

Peci claims that Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda -- who had started their careers in Potere Operaio and then shifted to Autonomia -- were part and parcel of the Red Brigades. "Morucci literally arrived with a suitcase full of weapons," including the notorious Skorpion with which Aldo Moro was killed and which brought down Genoa prosecutor Francesco Cogo. When they joined the BR, "they were told," says Peci, "to drop all their other ties. (Morucci) had ties with Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace, So far as I know, though, he didn't have any with Negri."

Morucci and Faranda rose very fast. He was put in charge of the "logistics front," she headed "masses." Practically speaking, says Peci, they were in a position to block anything the Red Brigades might decide to do. Both of them, according to the singing brigadier, took part in the kidnaping of Aldo Moro, the conclusion of which heightened dissension with the BR between the so-called "hawks," who wanted the Christian Democrat leader to die, and the "doves," who argued for returning the DC president unharmed.

The two recruits from Potere Operaio left the Red Brigades, taking with them as souvenirs the Skorpion and other weapons. The heads of the Roman BR column alerted "all the clandestine groups to warn them against giving aid or shelter to Morucci

and Faranda, who were described as "thieves" by Patrizio Peci. Which clandestine groups? The born-again terrorist's answer: "We even went to the big bosses (Piperno, Pace, and Scalzone), because we had heard rumors that somebody was fanning the fire. We told them that Morucci and his people, six or seven cadre types who had moved close to the BR, were thieves; and we told them that Scalzone and company had masterminded the effort to cause a split, so that they could take over leadership of the BR from outside."

And what did the "big bosses" reply? They said that they "considered the BR the only Italian organization to back, although there was some political dissent: it's one thing to criticize, but to make a break is something else again." Did the "big bosses" keep their word? As you will recall, Morucci and Faranda were arrested in the house of Giuliana Conforti, who told police: "I didn't know them. Franco Piperno introduced them to me under false names." Had these "big bosses" planned on taking over from the outside (not an easy thing for somebody who cannot boast close kinship)? Patrizio Peci says that the BR's suspicions of the three turned out to be well founded, although the bosses denied it.

And again: "As we could deduce after Morucci and Faranda fled and were captured, even before the Moro kidnaping there was an attempt on the part of the "big bosses" to influence BR activities, and those efforts were furthered by Morucci." It was no accident, Peci argues, that Valerio Morucci used to uphold an idea dear to Autonomia, which held that the Red Brigades "should be dissolved into the movement, meaning that BR elements should organize and lead groups of movement people in a series of illegal actions, at a lower level, but more widely scattered. This was the view propounded by Scalzone, Piperno, and Pace." Peci adds: "I don't know anything about Negri, though."

About the Autonomia leader, who he had already testified was not involved in the Moro case, Peci now says that the Red Brigades believed that "Negri had direct relations with Prima Linea, in that he laid down the political line for that organization to follow." Again: "As I recollect, early in 1977 Micaletto, acting for the BR, made contact with two Prima Linea people whose names I do not recall. In 1979 there were five or six meetings between Micaletto and Prima Linea people. Specifically, there was a BR-PL meeting at the national level."

Patrizio Peci then states: "Right after Franco Piperno was arrested in Paris, Rocco Micaletto told me that through channels he did not specify, Piperno had asked the organization for a meeting with BR spokesmen in Paris, to clarify his position in light of the charges against him. The organization, however, did not comply with that request." This is all the repentant BR man has to say about ties with Autonomia's leader. Is it really all he knows?

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